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Cross layer system design represents a paradigm shift that breaks the traditional
layer-boundaries in a network stack to enhance a wireless network in a number of
different ways. Existing work has used the cross layer approach to optimize a wireless
network in terms of packet scheduling, error correction, multimedia quality, power
consumption, selection of modulation/coding and user experience, etc. We explore
the use of new cross layer opportunities to achieve secrecy and efficiency of data trans-
mission in wireless networks. In the first part of this dissertation, we build secret key
establishment methods for private communication between wireless devices using the
spatio-temporal variations of symmetric-wireless channel measurements. We evaluate
our methods on a variety of wireless devices, including laptops, telosB sensor nodes,
and Android smartphones, with diverse wireless capabilities. We perform extensive
measurements in real-world environments and show that our methods generate high
entropy secret bits at a significantly faster rate in comparison to existing approaches.
While the first part of this dissertation focuses on achieving secrecy in wireless
networks, the second part of this dissertation examines the use of special pulse shaping
filters of the filterbank multicarrier (FBMC) physical layer in reliably transmitting
data packets at a very high rate. We first analyze the mutual interference power
across subcarriers used by different transmitters. Next, to understand the impact
of FBMC beyond the physical layer, we devise a distributed and adaptive medium
access control protocol that coordinates data packet traffic among the different nodes
in the network in a best effort manner. Using extensive simulations, we show that
FBMC consistently achieves an order-of-magnitude performance improvement over
orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) in several aspects, including
packet transmission delays, channel access delays, and effective data transmission
rate available to each node in static indoor settings as well as in vehicular networks.
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Cross layer system design represents a paradigm shift that breaks the traditional
layer-boundaries in a network stack to achieve desirable characteristics [1, 2]. Ex-
ploiting information across different layers offers numerous avenues for enhancing a
wireless network. Some of the primary benefits of cross layer design include optimiza-
tion/improvement in terms of packet scheduling [3], error correction [4], multimedia
quality and power consumption [5], selection of modulation and coding [6], user
experience [2], etc. In this work, we explore the use of new cross layer opportunities
to achieve secrecy and efficiency of data transmission in wireless networks. Our
systems-oriented, cross layer research enables pervasive wireless devices to efficiently
establish private communication channels that are secure from adversaries with un-
limited computational power. In addition, our work also enables these devices to
efficiently utilize the available wireless spectrum. Our research work demonstrates
how theoretical concepts can be transformed into real-life systems, which in turn can
serve as a strong foundation for building innovative, mobile systems and applications.
In the first part of this dissertation, we build secret key establishment methods for
private communication between wireless devices using the spatio-temporal variations
of symmetric-wireless channel measurements. Using physical layer measurements
of the wireless channel characteristics between any two nodes, we can establish a
secure upper layer communication channel between these two nodes. We evaluate our
methods on a variety of wireless devices, including laptops, telosB sensor nodes, and
Android smartphones, with diverse wireless capabilities under a variety of real-world
environments.
In the second part of this dissertation, we investigate the use of different physi-
2cal layer pulse shapes for efficiency of data transmission, depending on the type of
upper layer data traffic and the acceptable level of system computational complexity.
For example, when different nodes in the network exchange synchronous traffic, an
efficient, low complex system can be built using the well-known rectangular pulse
shape of the orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) physical layer [7, 8].
On the other hand, when applications primarily exchange best-effort traffic, where
the transmissions of different nodes are not necessarily synchronized, we can achieve
efficiency of data transmission, as we demonstrate in this work, through the use of
special square root Nyquist (SR Nyquist [9]) physical layer pulse shape at the expense
of only a slight increase in system complexity; this system is referred to as filterbank
multicarrier (FBMC [10]).
1.1 Achieving Secrecy in Wireless Networks
Secret key establishment is a fundamental requirement for private communication
between two entities. Currently, the most common method for establishing a private
communication channel is by using public key cryptography. However, there has been
growing interest in finding alternatives to public key cryptography owing to concerns
with the security of the public keys. Essentially, public key cryptography methods
become insecure against an adversary with unlimited computational power; i.e., they
do not provide information-theoretic security. Quantum cryptography [11, 12] is
an alternative to public key cryptography, which allows two parties to establish a
secret/symmetric key. While quantum cryptography applications have started to
appear recently [13], they are still very rare and expensive. We explore a less expensive
alternative for secret key establishment between wireless nodes, which is capable of
producing arbitrarily long secret keys, and which when used as one-time pad, can
provide security against adversaries with unlimited computational power.
At any point in time, the multipath properties of the wireless channel (gains, phase
shifts, and delays) are identical [14] on both directions of a link, because the radio
waves from each direction of the link traverse the same set of multipaths and undergo
identical radio wave propagation effects (reflection, refraction, scattering, diffraction,
etc.). The wireless channel characteristics change over time due to the movement of
3either end of the link and/or any intermediate objects in the environment. The chan-
nel properties are unique to the locations of the two endpoints of the link. Therefore,
an eavesdropper, who is a few wavelengths away from either endpoint, will measure a
different, uncorrelated radio channel [15]. Thus, the wireless channel characteristics
represent an inherent shared secret between any two wireless devices that can commu-
nicate. We exploit the physical layer measurements representing the wireless channel
characteristics to establish a secret/symmetric key for private communication at an
upper layer between these devices. Secret key establishment using wireless channel
variations can provide information-theoretic security, i.e., security against adversaries
with unlimited computational power, given that the reciprocal channel between the
legitimate nodes is statistically independent of the channel between an eavesdropper
and a legitimate node [16]. Figure 1.1 depicts the spatio-temporal and symmetric
variations of received signal strength measurements between a pair of wireless nodes.
1.2 Efficient Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks
Due to the rapid proliferation of wireless devices in recent times, the available
frequency spectrum space is very heavily used. Most of the existing wireless network
technologies, e.g., 802.11, operate on a fixed set of channels or frequencies over a
given bandwidth. Given this, certain portions of the wireless spectrum are heavily
crowded in comparison to others. Thus, next-generation wireless networks have an
opportunity to dynamically choose portions of the available spectrum that are under-
utilized, or alternatively, avoid those parts of the spectrum that are over-crowded.
Our research envisions the building of efficient dynamic spectrum access networks,
where multiple nodes compete to utilize a shared frequency spectrum, as shown in
Figure 1.2. While such networks have been gaining widespread attention in recent
years, building such networks presents numerous challenges in terms of achieving
synchronization, minimizing interference between the transmissions of different nodes
and system computational complexity.
For efficiency of data transmission, we choose a suitable physical layer pulse shape
on the basis of the traffic type and acceptable/desired level of system complexity.
Specifically, when applications primarily exchange best-effort traffic, where the trans-
4missions of different nodes are not necessarily synchronized, we have proposed to
build an efficient system through the use of special square–root Nyquist pulse shape at
the physical layer at the expense of only a slight increase in system complexity; this
system is referred to as filterbank multicarrier (FBMC [10]). FBMC, which promises
very low out-of-band energy of each subcarrier signal when compared to OFDM, is
evaluated in our work to understand its ability in reliably transmitting upper layer
data packets at a very high rate. We first analyze the mutual interference power across
subcarriers used by different transmitters. Next, to understand the impact of FBMC
beyond the physical layer, we devise a distributed and adaptive medium access control
protocol that coordinates data packet traffic among the different nodes in the network
in a best-effort manner.
1.3 Challenges
We address the following significant challenges in this dissertation.
1.3.1 Secret Key Extraction
When Alice and Bob collect channel measurements for secret key establishment,
their measurements may exhibit minor asymmetries due to noise, interference, hard-
ware limitations, manufacturing variations, vendor-specific differences in implement-
ing automatic gain control, and the inability in sampling the channel simultaneously
at both Alice and Bob with time-duplex transceivers. The main challenge is in making
Alice and Bob agree upon the same bit sequence while ensuring that during the process
of reconciling any potential bit mismatches, only a minimal amount of information is
leaked over the insecure public channel.
There may be short-term correlation between subsequent bits when Alice/Bob
happen to probe the channel more than once within the coherence time, where co-
herence time represents an interval over which the measurements remain predictable.
However, it is extremely difficult to estimate the coherence time due to the presence
of unpredictable movements of different objects in a real environment. Furthermore,
the information reconciliation stage reveals a certain fraction of bits to reconcile the
potential differences between Alice’s and Bob’s bitstreams. An adversary can take
advantage of the leaked bits, and guess portions of the extracted key. Therefore, the
5main challenge is in eliminating redundant/leaked information from the extracted bit
sequence so that the output bit sequence has high entropy bits.
Secret key extraction performance may vary depending on the type of environment
since the rate at which the channel changes depends on the movement of different
objects in environment. So, the key challenge is in finding the type of settings that
are well suited for secret key extraction – i.e., those settings which can produce secret
bits at a fast rate, while at the same time, not being vulnerable to certain new types
of attacks, which we demonstrate in this work.
When two groups of nodes, instead of only a pair of nodes, are used for secret
key generation with the goal of improving the secret key generation performance,
the asymmetry between the measurements of Alice and Bob increases due to the
simultaneous reduction in the channel sampling rate and increase in the time gap
between the bidirectional measurements of Alice and Bob. In other words, the use of
multiple nodes can negatively impact secret key extraction and the main challenge is
to reduce the increase in asymmetry even under decreased sampling rate and increased
time gap between the bidirectional measurements.
1.3.2 Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks
When we have multiple nodes, which possibly belong to different administrative
entities, compete to utilize the shared frequency spectrum, it is likely that the simulta-
neous transmissions of different nodes are not synchronized. However, the well-known
solution, i.e., OFDM, for sharing the spectrum requires perfect synchronization be-
tween different nodes, and a lack of synchronization will cause significant mutual
interference. In other words, OFDM, which is designed for exchanging synchronous
traffic, will have a poor cross layer performance when the nodes exchange best-effort
traffic, as we demonstrate in this work. Thus, the important challenge is to find an
alternative physical layer that is capable of sharing the spectrum without a centralized
control and also to develop a new medium access control protocol that can share the
spectrum among various nodes in a distributed manner.
While there are a large number of OFDM systems available commercially, cur-
rently, there exists no practical system implementation with the FBMC PHY layer.
This poses a significant challenge in evaluating FBMC for dynamic spectrum access.
6Thus, we need to develop a new alternative method of evaluation that is capable of
extensively modeling both the PHY and MAC layer aspects, at very small time-scales
such as micro seconds, for a very realistic evaluation of the cross layer performance
of FBMC.
1.4 Contributions
Our key contributions in this dissertation include the following.
1.4.1 Secret Key Extraction
We develop an environment adaptive secret key extraction scheme that works
in conjunction with techniques that we have borrowed from quantum cryptography,
namely information reconciliation [17] and privacy amplification [18], which can gen-
erate high entropy bits at a high rate.
We evaluate secret key extraction in different environments using off-the-shelf
802.11 devices and find the environment that is best suited for secret key extraction.
Our experimental results show that (i) in certain environments, due to lack of varia-
tions in the wireless channel, the extracted bits have very low entropy, making these
bits unsuitable for a secret key; and (ii) in dynamic scenarios where the two devices
are mobile, and/or where there is a significant movement in the environment, high
entropy bits are obtained fairly quickly.
We demonstrate a new form of attack on secret key extraction known as pre-
dictable channel attack where an adversary can cause the key establishing parties
to extract a predictable secret bit sequence. The adversary can cause this attack
by controlling the movements of intermediate objects in the environment. In other
words, the adversary can break the secret key extraction mechanism without spending
any computational power.
We explore the use of two groups of TelosB sensor nodes for secret key extraction.
We show that when two groups of nodes collaborate in exchanging probe packets for
collecting RSS measurements, they can extract stronger secret keys in an efficient
manner. We also show that the collaborating nodes can improve the performance
further when they exploit both space and frequency diversities.
7We develop an analytical method for effectively removing the effects of shadow
fading so that the secret key bits obtained are mainly due to the hard-to-predict effects
of fast-fading or small-scale fading. We show that applying a running average filter
to the channel measurements effectively removes the effects of shadow fading, which
are caused by obstructions in the environment. This establishes that the extracted
secret bits are primarily due to the hard-to-predict effects of fast-fading (or small-scale
fading), which are caused because of the relative motion between the radios and the
different objects in the environment. We use the well-known Gudmundson statistical
model for shadow fading signals to show that it is essentially a low pass filter whereas
the running average filter is a high pass filter. Our results show that depending on
the speed of nodes and the sampling rate, if we appropriately choose the size of the
running average window, we can significantly reduce the effects of shadow fading.
1.4.2 Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks
We derive an analytical expression for the interference power at a receiver due
to mutual interference across subcarriers used by different transmitters. We express
the mutual interference power on a subcarrier at a receiver node as a function of the
subcarrier indices in which the desired transmitter and the interferer transmit their
signals as well as of the wireless channel between the interferer and the receiver nodes.
We design and evaluate a new medium access control (MAC) layer that promises
a fair share of available spectrum to each node. Our distributed and adaptive MAC
protocol coordinates data packet traffic among the different nodes in the network in
a best-effort manner. It adapts the size of the channel (i.e., number of subcarriers)
of each node depending on the packet transmission success rate, and on how the
current channel access delay compares with the historic average delay. Our MAC
protocol increases or decreases the number of subcarriers in an additive increase
and multiplicative decrease (AIMD) manner with the aim of achieving fair use of
subcarriers across multiple nodes.
We evaluate the cross layer performance of FBMC and OFDM in static, indoor
settings as well as dynamic settings in vehicular networks. Our work highlights the
cross layer performance of FBMC in achieving order-of-magnitude improvement over
OFDM in terms of transmission delay, channel access delay and data rate available
8at the MAC layer.
We express our thesis statement in a concise form as follows. We can achieve
secrecy and efficiency of data transmission in wireless networks by exploiting new
cross layer opportunities.
The rest of this dissertation proposal is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes
our work on secret key extraction for a pair of devices using WiFi received signal
strength measurements in real environments. Chapter 3 presents our work on using
two groups of wireless sensor nodes for extracting stronger secret keys in an efficient
manner. In Chapter 4, we describe the use of filterbank multicarrier communication
system in conjunction with our AIMD MAC protocol for efficient use of the available
spectrum in dynamic spectrum access networks.
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Figure 1.1. Spatio-temporal and symmetric variations of received signal strength
measurements.
node 2 subcarrier 
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Secret key establishment is a fundamental requirement for private communication
between two entities. Currently, the most common method for establishing a secret
key is by using public key cryptography. However, public key cryptography consumes
a significant amount of computing resources and power that might not be available
in certain scenarios (e.g., sensor networks). More importantly, concerns about the
security of public keys in the future have spawned research on methods that do not
use public keys.
Quantum cryptography [11, 12] is a good example of an innovation that does
not use public keys. It uses the laws of quantum theory, specifically Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle, for sharing a secret between two end points. Although quantum
cryptography applications have started to appear recently [13], they are still very rare
and expensive.
A less expensive and more flexible solution to the problem of sharing secret keys
between wireless nodes (say Alice and Bob) is to extract secret bits from the inherently
random spatial and temporal variations of the reciprocal wireless channel between
them [19, 20, 21, 22, 16]. Essentially, we exploit the following properties of the
wireless channel for secret key extraction:
• Reciprocity of radio wave propagation: At any point in time, the multipath
properties of the radio channel (gains, phase shifts, and delays) are identical
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on both directions of a link, because the radio waves from each direction of
the link traverse the same set of multipaths and undergo identical radio wave
propagation effects (reflection, refraction, scattering, diffraction, etc.).
• Temporal variations in the radio channel: The multipath channel changes over
time due to the movement of either end of the link and/or any intermediate
objects in the environment.
• Spatial variations: The properties of the radio channel are unique to the lo-
cations of the two endpoints of the link. An eavesdropper, who is a few
wavelengths away from either endpoint, will measure a different, uncorrelated
radio channel [15].
Thus, any two wireless nodes that can communicate with each other inherently
share a secret between them, and we use that as the basis for extracting the secret
key bits. Secret key extraction using channel variations provides information-theoretic
security given that the reciprocal channel between the legitimate nodes is statistically
independent of the channel between an eavesdropper and a legitimate node [16]. In
other words, our secret key establishment method is capable of producing arbitrarily
long secret keys, which when used as one-time pad, can provide security against
adversaries with unlimited computational power.
Received signal strength (RSS) is a popular statistic of the radio channel and
can be used as the source of secret information shared between a transmitter and
receiver. We use RSS as a channel statistic, primarily because of the fact that most
of the current off-the-shelf wireless cards, without any modification, can measure it
on a per frame basis. The variation over time of the RSS, which is caused by motion
and multipath fading, can be quantized and used for generating secret keys. The
mean RSS value, a somewhat predictable function of distance, must be filtered out of
the measured RSS signal to ensure that an attacker cannot use the knowledge of the
distance between key establishing entities to guess some portions of the key. These
RSS temporal variations, as measured by Alice and Bob, cannot be measured by an
eavesdropper (say Eve) from another location unless she is physically very close to
Alice or Bob. However, due to nonideal conditions, including limited capabilities of
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the wireless hardware, Alice and Bob are unable to obtain identical measurements of
the channel. This asymmetry in measurements brings up the challenge of how to make
Alice and Bob agree upon the same bits without giving out too much information on
the channel that can be used by Eve to recreate secret bits between Alice and Bob.
Azimi-Sadjadi et al. [19] suggested using two well-known techniques from quantum
cryptography, information reconciliation and privacy amplification, to tackle the chal-
lenge caused by RSS measurement asymmetry. Information reconciliation techniques
(e.g., Cascade [17]) leak out minimal information to correct those bits that do not
match at Alice and Bob. Privacy amplification [18] reduces the amount of information
the attacker can have about the derived key. This is achieved by letting both Alice
and Bob use universal hash functions, chosen at random from a publicly known set of
such functions, to transform the reconciled bit stream into a nearly perfect random
bit stream.
Most of the previous research work on RSS-based secret key extraction, including
that of Azimi-Sadjadi et al. [19], is based on either simulations or theoretical analysis.
Other than the recent work by Mathur et al. [20] that was performed in a specific
indoor environment, there is very little research on evaluating how effective RSS-based
key extraction is in real environments under real settings. We address this important
limitation of the existing research in this paper with the help of wide-scale real-life
measurements in both static and dynamic environments. In order to perform our
measurements and subsequent evaluations, we implement different RSS quantization
techniques in conjunction with information reconciliation and privacy amplification.
We first collect measurements under different environments to generically evaluate
the effectiveness of secret key generation. We find that under certain environments
due to lack of variations in the channel, the extracted key bits have very low en-
tropy, making these bits unsuitable for a secret key. Interestingly, we also find
that an adversary can cause predictable key generation in these static environments.
However, in scenarios where Alice and Bob are mobile, and/or where there is a
significant movement in the environment, we find that high entropy bits are obtained
fairly quickly. Next, building on the strengths of the existing schemes, we develop
an environment adaptive secret key generation scheme that uses an adaptive lossy
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quantizer in conjunction with Cascade-based information reconciliation and privacy
amplification. Our measurements show that our scheme performs the best in terms
of generating high entropy bits at a high bit rate in comparison to the existing ones
that we evaluate. The secret key bit streams generated by our scheme also pass the
randomness tests of the NIST test suite [23] that we conduct.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we outline
our problem setup. We describe the secret key extraction process in Section 2.3
and present our adaptive secret bit generation method in Section 2.4. Section 2.5
describes our implementation. We present the characteristics of real-world received
signal strength measurements under a diverse set of environments in Section 2.6. We
compare different secret key extraction approaches in Section 2.7. We evaluate our
multiple bit extraction method in Section 2.8. We evaluate secret key extraction
using handheld devices in Section 2.9. We present the related work in Section 2.10
and summarize our findings in Section 2.11.
2.2 Problem Setup
In our problem setup, there are two wireless nodes, Alice and Bob, that need
to establish a shared/secret key. We assume that the adversary, Eve, can listen
to all the communication between the wireless nodes representing Alice and Bob.
Eve can also measure all the channels between herself and Alice and Bob at the
same time when Alice and Bob exchange probes and measure the channel between
themselves. Such a passive adversary model has been widely used/adopted in existing
measurements-based work on secret key extraction (e.g., [14, 24]). We also assume
that Eve knows the key extraction algorithm and the values of the various parameters
used in the algorithm. However, we assume that Eve is not very close (less than a
few multiples of the wavelength of the radio waves being used; for example, the
wavelength of signals in the 2.4 GHz band is approximately 12.5 cm) to either
Alice or Bob while they are exchanging probes. This ensures that Eve measures a
different, uncorrelated radio channel [15]; [24] experimentally show that there is little
mutual information between Eve and Alice/Bob; they also show that the information
obtained by Eve is negligible even if she possesses multiple antennas. We assume
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that Eve does not know the exact positions of Alice, Bob, and every intermediate
object at every possible time instant, and also does not know the electrical/magnetic
properties of every possible object in the environment; this will prevent Eve from
precharacterizing the wireless channel characteristics and later use sophisticated ap-
proaches like ray tracing to deduce the channel variations seen by Alice/Bob when
they collect the measurements. We assume that Eve is not interested in disrupting
the key establishment, i.e., she neither jams the communication channel between
Alice and Bob, nor does she modify any messages exchanged between Alice and
Bob. However, Eve is free to move any intermediate object between Alice and Bob
and affect the communication channel between them, although we assume that Eve
cannot restrict the movement of other objects in the channel and thus will not be able
to significantly increase the coherence time of the channel. In our earlier work [14], we
showed that in static scenarios, when Eve positions herself strategically on the signal
path between Alice and Bob, she can cause the predictable channel/key generation
attack. To avoid such attacks, in this work, we only consider dynamic scenarios1,
where Eve is incapable of causing predictable channel variations. We also assume
that Eve cannot cause a person-in-the-middle attack, i.e., Alice and Bob are not
authenticated. Hence, our proposed scheme works against passive adversaries. The
Diffie-Hellman secret key establishment scheme has found widespread use in network
security protocols and standards (e.g., for providing perfect forward secrecy, strong
password protocols, etc.) even without an authentication mechanism [25]. We believe
that our scheme will provide a strong alternative to the Diffie-Hellman scheme in
wireless networks. There is a growing amount of literature in authenticating wireless
devices based on their physical and radiometric properties (e.g., [26, 27]). These and
future authentication mechanisms can be used in conjunction with our efficient high
rate secret key establishment scheme.
2.3 Background on Secret Key Extraction Process
Existing secret key extraction approaches convert a set of RSS measurements into
a sequence of bits using a quantization stage. However, due to nonideal conditions,
1We also show that dynamic scenarios are best for key extraction in [14].
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including limited capabilities of the wireless hardware, Alice and Bob are unable
to obtain identical measurements of the channel. This asymmetry in measurements
brings up the challenge of how to make Alice and Bob agree upon the same bits
without giving out too much information on the channel that can be used by Eve to
recreate secret bits between Alice and Bob. Azimi-Sadjadi et al. [19] suggested using
two well-known techniques from quantum cryptography, information reconciliation
and privacy amplification, to tackle the challenge caused by RSS measurement asym-
metry. Information reconciliation techniques (e.g., Cascade [17]) leak out minimal
information to correct those bits that do not match at Alice and Bob. Privacy
amplification [18] reduces the amount of information the attacker can have about
the derived key. This is achieved by letting both Alice and Bob use universal hash
functions, chosen at random from a publicly known set of such functions, to transform
the reconciled bit stream into a nearly perfect random bit stream. In our work, we
also use the information reconciliation and privacy amplification stages. Figure 2.1
depicts the process of wireless RSS-based secret key extraction. We describe the
purpose of each stage as follows.
2.3.1 Quantization
To extract a secret key based on wireless channel variations, Alice and Bob begin
by exchanging probe packets and measuring RSS values of the probes. After collecting
enough measurements, each node quantizes its measurements to generate an initial
bitstream. The quantization is done using specified thresholds. Figure 2.2 shows a
sample quantizer with two thresholds. Alice and Bob perform the following steps in
the quantization stage - (i) define two quantization thresholds q+ and q− such that
q+ = µ + (α × σ) and q− = µ − (α × σ), where µ and σ represent the running
average and standard deviation over a window of RSS measurements, and α ≥ 0.
(ii) Discard those measurements that lie between q+ and q− and maintain a list of
indices of measurements that are discarded; exchange the indices list and only keep
those measurements that both parties decide not to discard. (iii) Generate initial
bitstreams by extracting a 1 or a 0 from each RSS measurement depending on whether
the measurement lies above q+ or below q−. While this kind of single bit quantization
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with two thresholds was introduced in [20], many other earlier works (e.g., [22, 16, 19])
also use some form of thresholding for performing single bit quantization.
2.3.2 Information Reconciliation
Once both Alice and Bob extract an initial bitstream by quantization, to agree
upon the same secret key, they must correct the bits where their bitstreams dif-
fer. Differences arise primarily due to noise and interference, hardware limitations,
manufacturing variations, vendor-specific differences in implementing automatic gain
control, and the inability in sampling the channel simultaneously at both Alice and
Bob with time-duplex transceivers.
Cascade [17] is an iterative, interactive information reconciliation protocol. In
Cascade, one party (say Alice) permutes the bitstream randomly, divides it into
small blocks, and sends permutation and parity information of each block to the
other party (Bob). Bob permutes his bitstream in the same way, divides it into small
blocks, computes parities, and checks for parity mismatches. For each mismatch, Bob
performs a binary search on the block to find if a few bits can be changed to make
the block match the parity. These steps are iterated a number of times to ensure a
high probability of success.
Bloch et al. present an alternative reconciliation method that uses multilevel
coding and optimized low density parity check codes [28]. However, they conclude
that the memory requirements and the complexity of their method may be too high for
embedded or low-cost systems. In this work, we only consider Cascade for information
reconciliation.
2.3.3 Privacy Amplification
There may be short-term correlation between subsequent bits when the channel
probing rate is greater than 1
coherence time
, where coherence time is defined as the time
interval during which the channel measurements remain predictable. However, it is
extremely difficult to estimate the coherence time due to the presence of unpredictable
movements of different objects in a real environment. When two subsequent channel
measurements occur within the coherence time, the bits extracted may exhibit short-
term correlations. Further, the information reconciliation stage reveals a certain
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fraction of bits to reconcile the differences between Alice’s and Bob’s bitstreams. An
adversary can take advantage of the leaked bits, and guess portions of the extracted
key. Therefore, it is necessary to remove those leaked bits.
Privacy amplification addresses these two problems by reducing the size of the
output bitstream. It is achieved by letting both Alice and Bob use universal hash
functions, chosen at random from a publicly known set of such functions, and generate
fixed size smaller length output bit streams from longer input bit streams. These
methods are generally based on leftover hash lemma, which is a well-known technique
for obtaining random bits from imperfect random sources [18]. The need for privacy
amplification was recognized by [29].
2.3.4 Metrics for Comparing Different Key Extraction
Approaches
We compare different secret key extraction approaches (e.g., Aono et al. [22],
Tope et al. [16], Mathur et al. [20], Azimi-Sadjadi et al. [19]) for the quality of the
bit streams they generate. This quality is quantified by three performance metrics -
1. Entropy: Entropy characterizes the uncertainty associated with a random
variable. We estimate the entropy of a bit stream using NIST test suite’s
approximate entropy test [23].
2. Bit mismatch rate: We define the bit mismatch rate as the ratio of the
number of bits that do not match between Alice and Bob to the number of bits
extracted from RSS quantization.
3. Secret bit rate: We define the secret bit rate as the average number of secret
bits extracted per collected measurement. This rate is measured in terms of
final output bits produced after taking care of bit losses due to information
reconciliation and privacy amplification.
Note that the bit mismatch rate value we calculate is based on the bits we obtain
immediately after the quantization step, and not after the privacy amplification
step. In fact, the bit mismatch rate is expected to be zero after the information
reconciliation step.
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2.4 Adaptive Secret Bit Generation (ASBG)
Our experimental results in Section 2.7 suggest that some quantizers like those
of Aono et al. or Tope et al. that aim to achieve high bit rate can output bit
streams with low entropy in certain settings, especially in those that have minimal
movement. On the other hand, some other quantizers like that of Mathur et al. can
output bit streams with reasonably high entropy but sacrifice the bit rate to achieve
this or vice versa. In summary, the existing approaches that use RSS measurements
do not generate secret bits at a high rate and/or with high entropy. We develop a
method, which we call Adaptive Secret Bit Generation (ASBG), that builds on the
strengths of the existing approaches. In our method, we use a modified version of
Mathur’s quantizer [20] in conjunction with two well-known information reconciliation
and privacy amplification techniques.
We first describe our quantizer and then identify the differences with Mathur’s
scheme. Our modified quantizer is described as follows. (i) Alice and Bob consider a
block of consecutive measurements of size block size which is a configurable parame-
ter2. For each block, they calculate two adaptive thresholds q+ and q− independently
such that q+ = mean+α ∗ std deviation and q− = mean−α ∗ std deviation, where
α ≥ 0. (ii) Alice and Bob parse their RSS measurements and drop RSS estimates
that lie between q+ and q− and maintain a list of indices to track the RSS estimates
that are dropped. They exchange their list of dropped RSS estimates and only keep
the ones that they both decide not to drop. (iii) Alice and Bob generate their bit
streams by extracting a 1 or a 0 for each RSS estimate if the estimate lies above q+
or below q−, respectively.
Our modified quantizer divides the RSS measurements into smaller blocks of size
block size and calculates the thresholds for each block separately. The adaptive thresh-
olds allows our quantizer to adapt to slow shifts of RSS. Mathur et al. [20] subtract
a running windowed average of RSS measurements before computing thresholds q+
and q− to make their scheme adaptive to the slow variations of RSS. We also perform
experiments to find the optimal block size. The results of these experiments are shown
2The Cascade block size is not related to the block size we use for determining the quantization
thresholds.
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in Section 2.7. Unlike the Mathur quantizer that preserves only a single bit from m
consecutive 1s or 0s and drops the other repeating m− 1 bits, our modified quantizer
extracts a bit out of each measurement that falls above the upper threshold or below
the lower threshold but depends on the privacy amplification step to remove the effect
of correlated bits.
Various single bit quantization methods drop a large amount of RSS samples that
lie in between the upper and lower thresholds. These dropped samples constitute a
loss of valuable information that can be used by Alice and Bob to generate secret
bits and also result in an inefficient utilization of the wireless medium because more
probes must be sent and received. Furthermore, privacy amplification also reduces
the secret bit rate while increasing entropy. To increase the secret bit rate, we propose
an adaptive scheme for extracting multiple bits from a single RSS measurement. Our
multiple bit extraction scheme is described as follows.
Once Alice and Bob collect the RSS measurements, they perform the following
steps - (i) determine the Range of RSS measurements from the minimum and the
maximum measured RSS values; (ii) find N , the number of bits that can be extracted
per measurement, where N ≤ blog2Rangec; (iii) divide the Range into M = 2N
equal sized intervals; (iv) choose an N bit assignment for each of the M intervals
(for example, use the Gray code sequence [30]); and (v) for each RSS measurement,
extract N bits depending on the interval in which the RSS measurement lies. After
completing the above steps, as in the single bit extraction case, Alice and Bob use
information reconciliation to correct the mismatching bits, and finally, apply privacy
amplification to the reconciled bit stream and extract a high entropy bit stream.
Our results, as presented in Section 2.7, show that our single bit extraction in con-
junction with information reconciliation and privacy amplification is able to achieve
higher entropy in comparison to existing schemes, and our multiple bit enhancement
(evaluated in Section 2.8) allows us to significantly increase the secret bit rate as well.
2.5 Implementation
We implement our key extraction scheme on two laptops (Alice and Bob) equipped
with built-in Intel PRO/Wireless 3945ABG wireless network cards, operating in the
20
802.11g mode. Both laptops run the Ubuntu Linux operating system. In order to
establish a secret key, Alice and Bob exchange probe packets periodically and use
these probe packets to measure the RSS values.
In our implementation, we use specially crafted 802.11 management frames as
probe packets. We prefer to use management frames as a communication mechanism
over standard data frames because in the case of data frames, acknowledgement
frames are sent by the receiving wireless card. On the other hand, in the case of
management frames, no acknowledgement frame is sent by the receiving wireless
card. Moreover, management frames are prioritized over data frames and are queued
separately. These facts motivate us to design our own acknowledgement scheme using
management frames instead of data frames to better control the probing rate. In our
implementation, among the different management frames, we choose to use the beacon
frames for the communication between the initiator and the responder. However, data
frames could be used opportunistically as well since, in this case, we can obtain RSS
measurements without sending extra traffic in the network.
The sequence number field of beacon packet is used as our protocol’s sequence
number to handle packet loss and retransmissions. We use raw packet injection in the
monitor mode to send these specially crafted beacon frames. We utilize ipwraw [31],
a wireless card driver for Intel 3945 cards, for raw packet injection. We also use the
monitor mode to receive the beacon frames. In any other mode (e.g., the AP, or STA
mode), the wireless device driver does not forward these frames to any upper layer
applications. In our implementation, the endpoints exchange beacon frames at a rate
of approximately 20 frames per second, and measure the RSS values on a per-frame
basis. The RSS measurements we collect are reported by ipwraw driver in the radio
tap header of each received frame [32].
We implement our key extraction scheme in a modular way so that different meth-
ods of performing quantization, information reconciliation, or privacy amplification
can be put together to build different schemes using the same basic framework. To
compare the performance of different quantizers, we implement them as pluggable
modules to our key extraction scheme. For information reconciliation, we use the
well-known interactive Cascade [17] protocol. For privacy amplification, we use the
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2-universal hash family of functions. Alice and Bob use these hash functions to
generate the output secret bits. We describe our implementation in greater detail in
our work [14].
We also use an Atheros-based card to evaluate the effect of heterogeneous hardware
on the key extraction process. We present the results that we obtain using the Atheros
card in Section 2.6.5.
2.6 Measurements
In this work, we observe the variations in the wireless channel through measure-
ments of RSS on a per frame basis. An RSS measurement represents the average of
the energy arriving during the preamble sequence. The wireless card drivers report
the RSS values as integers, and the calculation of RSS is vendor dependent. For
example, Atheros devices report RSS values from −35 dB to −95 dB, Symbol devices
report RSS values from −50 dB to −100 dB, in 10 dB steps, and Cisco devices report
RSS values in the range −10 dB to −113 dB [33]. We use Intel-based wireless cards
for all of our experiments except one experiment with heterogeneous devices, in which
we also an Atheros-based wireless card. Each of our RSS measurements is quantized
to produce one or more bits, depending on the quantization scheme used, and forms
the basis for key extraction.
We conduct our experiments in a wide variety of environmental settings and under
different scenarios (with and without mobility of endpoints/intermediate objects,
etc.). The environments considered include an underground concrete tunnel, a typical
office building, and different outdoor environments. The primary goal of these exper-
iments is to find the type of settings that are best suited for secret key extraction and
also to evaluate the capability of our secret key extraction approach in producing bit
streams with high entropy, minimal number of mismatched bits between Alice and
Bob, and at a fast rate.
2.6.1 Stationary Endpoints and Intermediate Objects
2.6.1.1 Experiment A: Underground Concrete Tunnel
We perform our first experiment inside an underground concrete tunnel that runs
between two engineering buildings inside the University of Utah campus. The concrete
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tunnel provides an environment that is free from most of the external interference
sources, and the effects of mobility of any objects in the environment. Therefore,
even though this is an atypical environment, it provides us the opportunity to study
the amount of channel variation observed in a completely stationary environment.
The two laptops are separated by a distance of about 10 feet during the experiment.
Figure 2.3 shows the variations in RSS measurements collected by Alice and Bob. As
expected, there are not many noticeable variations in the channel - at each instant,
the RSS values vary only as much as 2 dB from the mean. We also note that the
curves for Alice and Bob do not follow each other, indicating a channel with low
reciprocity. This happens because the variations in a static channel are primarily
generated by hardware imperfections and thermal effects which are nonreciprocal.
RSS measurements in this type of environment contain very low inherent entropy.
Therefore, it is not possible to extract secret bits at a fast rate in this type of setting.
2.6.1.2 Experiment B: Gallery in the Engineering Building
Next, we perform RSS measurements in an indoor setting in one of the engineering
buildings. This experiment is done on a holiday evening to ensure that the gallery is
mostly empty and there is minimal external movement. Note that unlike Experiment
A, this setting has normal interference effects caused by other wireless devices operat-
ing in the vicinity. This setting allows us to study the channel variations with laptops
separated by larger distances (∼ 30 feet), in a relatively calm indoor environment.
Figure 2.4 shows the variations in RSS measurements made by Alice and Bob. We
find that like our tunnel experiment, Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are significantly
different, indicating a very low channel reciprocity. The nonreciprocity of the channel
is primarily due to the large distance between the laptops. When the distance between
Alice and Bob becomes large, the channel measurements are dominated by random
thermal noise and different interference sources affecting each laptop in a different
manner. Like the tunnel scenario, it is not possible to extract secret bits at a fast
rate in this type of setting either.
23
2.6.1.3 Experiment C: Lawn inbetween the Cafeteria
and Library
We perform this experiment on a calm, windless day with minimal external
movement on a lawn under the trees inbetween the cafeteria and the library. The
distance between the laptops is about 10 feet. Figure 2.5 shows the RSS measurement
variations as seen by Alice and Bob, respectively. In this figure, due to the stationary
settings, we only find infrequent, small-scale variations in the channel measurements.
This experiment shows that low-reciprocity is not just a characteristic of the indoor
environments; it can occur even in typical stationary outdoor environments. Similar
to the first two experiments, this type of setting is also not conducive to fast secret
bit extraction.
2.6.2 Mobile Endpoints
2.6.2.1 Experiment D: Walk Inside an Engineering Building
To examine the effect of mobility of nodes in indoor environments, we carry around
two laptops at normal walking speed on the third floor of an engineering building and
perform RSS measurements. The laptops are carried along the corridors in the third
floor in such a way that one trails the other and are separated by a distance of 10-15
feet for the most part3. Figure 2.6 depicts the variations in RSS values measured by
Alice and Bob. As we can clearly observe, unlike previous experiments, the channel
varies often with a wide variation window (−49 dB to −73 dB) and with a high degree
of reciprocity. This experiment shows that mobility in indoor settings can help achieve
fast secret key extraction from RSS measurements by increasing the inherent entropy
of the measurements and by improving the reciprocity of the channel.
2.6.2.2 Experiment E: Walk from an Engineering Building
to the Cafeteria
We perform an experiment by carrying two laptops while walking at a normal
speed from an engineering building to the cafeteria along two parallel streets. For
most of the experiment, the laptops are separated by a distance of about 20-25
feet. The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 2.7. As we can see, the
3Except for the very initial phase of our experiments, and/or when there is intervening traffic in
our paths during the experiment, the specified distance is maintained.
24
measurements show a wide range of variation. The channel variation window is
from −49 dB to −76 dB. We also note that like the measurements while walking
inside the engineering building, the RSS measurements in this experiment also show
a high degree of reciprocity. This shows that the outdoor environment combined with
mobility causes a significant increase in the variation of the channel and improves its
reciprocity. Consequently, we can expect a significant increase in the secret bit rate
compared to the stationary experiments.
2.6.2.3 Experiment F: Bike Ride on City Streets
To evaluate the effect of nodes moving faster than normal walking speeds on the
channel variation, we perform an outdoor experiment while we go on a bike tour
on city streets. With one bike trailing another, a distance of 10 feet or more is
maintained for most of the bike ride. As expected, this outdoor experiment exhibits
the widest variations (−35 dB to −70 dB) in the channel, as shown in Figure 2.8. The
bikes moving at a higher speed compared to walking create an even faster changing
channel. As in the previous two cases, this environment also results in a highly
reciprocal channel. These two factors together help in achieving a higher secret bit
generation rate.
2.6.3 Mobile Intermediate Objects
2.6.3.1 Experiment G: Crowded Cafeteria
As we find in our previous experiments that mobile nodes result in a variable and
highly reciprocal channel, we expect to observe similar effects if we have moving
intermediate objects in the environment between the nodes instead of the nodes
moving themselves. To verify this, we first perform an experiment where we study
the effects of randomly moving intermediate objects at low speed. We conduct this
experiment during a busy lunch hour in a crowded cafeteria. We keep our laptops
stationary on two tables separated by a distance of 10 feet across the main entrance of
the cafeteria. In this setting, we see many people frequently walk between these two
tables. The channel variations measured by Alice and Bob are shown in Figure 2.9.
As expected, even though the laptops are stationary, the random movements of people
inbetween causes channel variations comparable to the last three experiments with
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mobile endpoints.
2.6.3.2 Experiment H: Across a Busy Road
We perform another experiment to examine the effect of fast moving intermedi-
ate objects between two stationary nodes on the RSS measurements. We conduct
this experiment across a busy road adjacent to the engineering building. In this
experiment, the vehicles on the road move at high speeds (∼ 30-40 mph). Our
laptops are stationary and are separated by a distance of about 25 feet across the
road. This environment causes the nodes to experience the highest packet loss rate
compared to all the previous experiments. We expect the channel variations to be
larger than the previous measurement as the intermediate objects are moving at a
faster rate in this case. However, Figure 2.10 shows that the channel variation window
is smaller (−70 dB to −77 dB) than the cafeteria case (Experiment G). Notice that
the channel variation and reciprocity in Experiment H are still high compared to
the pure stationary environment with a similar distance between the two laptops
(Experiment B) and hence will result in secret key extraction at a faster rate.
2.6.4 Predictable Channel Attack
As mentioned earlier, stationary environments cannot support fast secret key
extraction. However, another significant drawback of stationary environments is that
an adversary can use planned movements in such environments, causing desired and
predictable changes in the channel between the actual sender and receiver nodes.
We conduct two experiments to show that the adversary can, in fact, cause desired
changes in the channel between the sender and receiver by controlling the movements
of some intermediate object or of the actual radios. The first experiment is conducted
in a student lab in one of the engineering buildings with two laptops; the separation
between the two laptops is about 10 feet and the intermediate object is moved at
about the halfway point inbetween the laptops.
The schematic of the first experiment is shown in Figure 2.11. A person (say
X), sitting on a chair and intermittently leaning backward and forward, takes the
role of the intermediate object. Sitting on the chair, whenever X leans backward
obstructing the line of sight path, the RSS drops, and whenever X leans forward so
26
that there is no obstruction along the line of sight path, the RSS regains its original
value. Figure 2.12 shows the variations of the RSS values and the pattern of variation
follows the movements of X. Under these circumstances, when any key extraction
scheme is used on such a data set, it produces a predictable pattern of secret bits.
For the RSS values shown in Figure 2.12, our quantization scheme actually gener-
ates an alternating sequence of multiple 0s and 1s, e.g., 0000111100001111 . . .. Alice
and Bob could possibly use random subsampling of the bit sequence, as in [20], or use
privacy amplification, to ensure that the resulting bit pattern is random. However,
if an adversary is able to completely control the bit sequence coming out of the
quantization process, then no postprocessing technique will be able to ensure the
security of the resulting bit sequence. Consequently, it is important to weigh the
relationship between the adversary’s ability to control the environment and the block
size used in subsampling or privacy amplification.
In the second experiment, we use a laptop (receiver) and a wireless router (sender)
such that they are separated by about 5 feet. The wireless router periodically sends
beacon packets that are received by the laptop. While resting the hinges of the laptop
on a flat table, we move the laptop back and forth so that the leading edge of its base
goes up and down. Again, as in the first experiment, the RSS values follow a pattern
similar to Figure 2.12.
It is very important to note that we obtain the above results even with coarse
movements, without the use of any precision machinery to create the movements.
Thus, our experiments demonstrate that it is quite easy for an adversary to launch a
“predictable channel” attack in a stationary environment and cause desired changes
in the channel between the sender and receiver, making them extract a predictable
sequence of secret key bits. One of the possible ways to avoid this attack is to use
the RSS measurement-based secret extraction scheme only in places where multiple
moving objects are present so that the attacker’s movement alone will not be able to
change the channel predictably. The effectiveness of the predictable channel attack
on key extraction methods using other channel characteristics (e.g., channel impulse
response) will be explored in the future.
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2.6.5 Heterogeneous Devices
The experiments described so far use identical hardware for both transmitter
and receiver. However in reality, different users could have different hardware. To
investigate the effects of using heterogeneous devices, we perform an experiment in
a setting similar to that of Experiment D (walk inside an engineering building).
For this experiment, Alice is equipped with an Intel 3945 ABG card and Bob with
an Atheros chipset-based card. Figure 2.13 depicts the variations in RSS values
measured by Alice and Bob. We can clearly see that even with heterogeneous
endpoints, the channel measurements exhibit a very high degree of reciprocity. Alice’s
RSS values range from −80 dB to −51 dB while Bob’s RSS values range from
−70 dB to −46 dB. We find that with heterogeneous hardware, when using our
quantization method, the mismatch fraction between Alice’s and Bob’s bit streams
is about 11%. In our implementation, information reconciliation can handle this
mismatch rate. Therefore, even though heterogeneous hardware introduces higher
bit mismatch rates than using homogeneous ones, we can still perform secret key
extraction with reasonable efficiency.
2.6.6 Summary of Measurements
In summary, the environments with stationary endpoints and stationary interme-
diate objects exhibit small-scale variations in the wireless channel. Comparatively,
environments with mobile endpoints exhibit a much wider variation in the channel.
The small-scale variations (for example, −55 dB to −57 dB in Experiment A) in
static settings are mainly due to variations in the hardware and random noise. On
the other hand, the large-scale variations in the mobile settings (for example, −35 dB
to −70 dB in Experiment F) are primarily caused by actual changes in the channel.
Random noise due to the hardware are also present in the measurements taken in the
mobile settings, but its effects are not large enough to affect the reciprocity of the
channel. Therefore, stationary environmental settings yield much higher bit mismatch
rates compared to mobile settings. Further, due to lack of enough variations, static
settings also produce bit streams with very low secret bit rates. In short, mobility
improves both secret bit rate and bit mismatch rate and hence, mobile environments
28
are better suited for the RSS measurement-based key extraction schemes.
An adversary can potentially guess the secret key established between the sender
and receiver if the adversary, by some means, can affect the channel in a predictable
way. Before applying the key extraction methods based on wireless channel char-
acteristics, care must be taken to ensure that there is enough randomness in the
environment so that an adversary cannot cause such attacks. One way to ensure
this is to force Alice and/or Bob to move in a somewhat unpredictable manner while
extracting secret keys. Environments including outdoor busy streets and crowded
cafeterias are characterized by unpredictable relative motion between the sender,
receiver, and the objects in the environment. These environments are most suitable
for key extraction based on reciprocal and dynamic wireless channels.
2.7 Comparison of Key Extraction Approaches
in Different Environments
In this section, we compare the performance of ASBG with other existing schemes
in terms of entropy, secret bit rate, and bit mismatch rate. Although ASBG is capable
of multiple bit extraction, we evaluate only single bit extraction in this section. We
show that ASBG not only outputs a secret bit stream with the highest entropy but
also the secret bit rate and bit mismatch fraction of ASBG are comparable, if not
better than all the existing methods.
Various key extraction approaches that we compare in this work use one or more
configurable parameters. We choose the parameters for all these quantization schemes
such that they help strike a balance between the entropy and the secret bit rate.
For the results shown in this section, we use the following configurable parameters.
In the scheme of Aono et al., the configurable parameter β is chosen such that at
most, 15% of the RSS measurements are deleted from the data set. The method of
Tope et al. uses two thresholds - γl and γh. We choose γl = avg of delta values +
0.4 ∗ std deviation, and γh = avg of delta values + std deviation. In the scheme of
Mathur et al., two thresholds q+, q− and m, the minimum number of measurements
on an excursion above or below the thresholds, are used such that q+ = mean+ α ∗
standard deviation and q− = mean − α ∗ standard deviation. In order to remove
the affects of slowly moving average signal power, as suggested in [20], we subtract a
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windowed average from each RSS measurement. We choose α = 0.2 and m = 2 to
ensure that a large fraction of measurements is considered for bit extraction. We do
not implement the random subsampling step because although this step improves the
entropy of the extracted bit stream, it negatively impacts the secret bit rate. In the
scheme of Azimi et al., a threshold value of 10 is used to determine the deep fades.
When extracting one bit per measurement, ASBG uses two thresholds q+, q− with
α = 0.8 and block size = 25. Figure 2.14 shows the variation of the bit mismatch rate
with block size for our ASBG scheme. We observe that the mismatch rate gradually
falls and becomes very small after a certain block size threshold and stays small even
when the block size is increased beyond the threshold. We pick a block size (= 25)
where the mismatch rate is low.
The performance of the different secret key extraction schemes is shown in Fig-
ures 2.15, 2.16 and 2.17. The scheme of Aono et al. has the highest secret bit
rate. However, their scheme produces bit streams with very low entropy. On the
other hand, the scheme of Mathur et al. generates bit streams with relatively high
entropy at a moderate rate. Note that when a random sampling step is employed in
the scheme of Mathur et al., the secret bit rate will be correspondingly lower than
what we report in Figure 2.17. The scheme of Azimi-Sadjadi et al. results in bit
streams with highest entropy. However, the bit rate of their scheme is very low.
ASBG produces bit streams with highest entropy, like the scheme of Azimi-Sadjadi
et al., while still maintaining the bit rate as high as the scheme of Mathur et al. In
Figure 2.15, the plots corresponding to the scheme of Azimi-Sadjadi et al. and ASBG
are one behind the other.
To ensure the randomness of the bit streams generated by ASBG, we also run
randomness tests available in the NIST test suite [23]. There are a total of 16 different
statistical tests in the NIST test suite. Of these 16 tests, we run only 8 tests. The bit
streams that we obtain from our experiments meet the input size recommendation [23]
of the 8 NIST tests only. We find that the ASBG-generated bit streams pass all the
8 tests. The results of these tests are shown in Table 2.1, Table 2.2, and Table 2.3.
The remaining 8 tests require a very large input bit stream (specifically, 6 of the 8
remaining tests require ≈ 106 bits).
30
We briefly describe the purpose of these statistical tests in the NIST test suite [23]
as follows. The frequency test determines whether the number of ones and zeros in
a sequence are approximately the same. The block frequency test checks whether
the frequency of ones in a given M -bit block is approximately M/2. Using numeric
values −1 and +1 in place of bits 0 and 1, the cumulative sums test determines
whether the cumulative sum of the partial sequences occurring in the tested sequence
is too large or too small relative to the expected behavior of the cumulative sum
for random sequences. The runs test verifies whether the number of runs of ones
and zeros of various lengths is as expected for a random sequence. The purpose of
the longest run of ones (LRO) test is to determine whether the length of the LRO
within the tested sequence is consistent with the length of the LRO that would be
expected in a random sequence. The FFT test checks for periodic features that would
indicate a deviation from the assumption of randomness. The approximate entropy
test compares the frequency of overlapping blocks of two consecutive lengths against
the expected result for a random sequence. The serial test determines whether the
number of occurrences of the 2m m-bit overlapping patterns is approximately the
same as would be expected for a random sequence.
Each of these statistical tests outputs a P-value; the P-value summarizes the
strength of the evidence against the null hypothesis, which corresponds to the fact
that the sequence being tested is random. P-value denotes the probability that a
perfect random number generator would have produced a sequence less random than
the input sequence that is tested. For a P-value ≥ 0.01, the sequence is considered
as random with a confidence of 99%. Note that all the P-values shown in Table 2.1,
Table 2.2, and Table 2.3 are at least 0.01, which demonstrates that the secret bit
streams are in fact random with a very high degree of confidence.
2.8 Multiple Bit Extraction
In this section, we evaluate the performance of extracting multiple bits from a
single RSS sample. The goal here is to find whether or not the extraction of multiple
bits from a single RSS sample increases the secret bit rate in comparison to single bit
extraction.
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In Section 2.6, we have shown that the measurements from static settings exhibit
a very narrow RSS range (for example, only 2 dB variation in the experiment of
Section 2.6.1). Extracting even 2 bits from an RSS sample requires a range of at least
4 dB when RSS is reported in 1 dB steps. Further, in Section 2.7, we have shown
that the mismatch rate in the static settings is as high as 50%. Attempting to extract
multiple bits will cause the mismatch rate to increase further. Therefore, we apply
our multiple bit extraction method only to mobile settings that do not suffer from
these problems of narrow range and very high mismatch rates.
Recall from Section 2.4 that N is the number of bits extracted per RSS mea-
surement, and M (= 2N) is the number of equi-sized intervals into which the RSS
range is divided. Figure 2.18 shows the mismatch rates for extracting N = 2 − 4
bits, respectively, from each RSS measurement. Observe that the mismatch fraction
increases with N , the number of bits extracted per measurement. Further, the way
in which the N bits are assigned to each of the M intervals also affects the mismatch
fraction. For example, the use of Gray codes results in a substantially lower mismatch
fraction compared to the use of a regular binary sequence, as shown in Figure 2.18.
Due to nonperfect channel reciprocity, if an RSS measurement of Alice and that of
Bob belong to adjacent intervals, use of Gray codes ensures that the N bits extracted
by Alice and Bob differ by at most one bit, whereas using a regular binary sequence
causes the bits extracted by Alice and Bob to potentially differ in all the N bits.
This accounts for a lower mismatch rate and subsequently higher secret bit rate when
using a Gray code sequence.
Figure 2.19 shows a comparison of secret bit rates for our single and multiple
bit extraction methods under various mobile settings. Notice that for the mobile
settings, the secret bit rate for single bit extraction is about 16%, whereas for 2 bits
extraction (N = 2) using Gray coding, the secret bit rate is about 67%. Notably,
the secret bit rate of the multiple bit extraction method is at least four times higher
than that of the single bit extraction method even when only 2 bits are extracted
from each measurement. This substantial improvement accounts for the fact that
the single bit extraction method drops all the RSS measurements that lie within the
upper and lower thresholds, while the multiple bit extraction method utilizes most
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of the measurements. Furthermore, similar to our single bit extraction method, the
extracted bit streams have an entropy value close to 1 due to privacy amplification.
To summarize, the multiple bit quantization scheme substantially improves the secret
bit rate in environments with mobile devices.
2.9 Secret Key Extraction Using Handheld Devices
Given the widespread prevalence of inexpensive and low-power mobile devices, in
this section, we evaluate our secret key extraction using two mobile devices, Google
Nexus One smartphones, that are equipped with Broadcom BCM 4329 chipset-based
802.11 wireless network cards. We first perform experiments similar to the ones
described in the previous section in two different environments. Although not shown
here, we obtain high entropy secret bits fairly quickly when using these smartphones
and our secret bit streams also pass the NISTs approximate entropy test, achieving an
entropy value close to the ideal value of one. In the rest of this section, we examine the
impact of distances between two smartphones, Alice and Bob, on secret key extraction
in two different environments while they transmit at a very low power.
2.9.1 Experimental Setup
We conduct a number of experiments in the University of Utah campus under two
different environments that are changing with time. In each environment, we perform
four walk-experiments where the phones representing Alice and Bob are carried at
normal walking speeds. The average distance (d) in feet between Alice and Bob is
varied with each experiment and d ∈ {25, 50, 75, 100}.
This first environment is a hallway on the third floor of the Merrill Engineering
Building. In the experiments conducted in this environment, our phones use the
lowest transmit power of 4 dBm.
We conduct a second set of experiments in an outdoor environment across varying
terrain, with many trees and bushes in the path between Alice and Bob. Because of
the terrain and obstructions in this environment, the path losses are higher. Due to
greater path loss in this environment, we use a higher transmit power of 8 dBm.
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2.9.2 Results
In this subsection, we evaluate secret key extraction as a function of distance
between Alice and Bob4. Our results show that in the hallway environment, even
with the lowest transmit power, Alice and Bob can extract about 0.25 secret bits
per probe when they are separated by about 25 feet. Figure 2.20 shows a plot of
secret bits per probe as a function of the distance between Alice and Bob. Though
we use a lower transmit power in the hallway-environment, in comparison to the
trees-environment, the hallway-environment achieves a higher performance due to
lower signal attenuation – from our measurements, we find that for a given distance,
the average received powers are about 2 − 7 dB higher in the hallway environment
in comparison to the obstructed outdoor environment. As we show in Figure 2.20,
secret bits per probe decreases with increase in distance, which is attributed to the
following reason: As the distance increases, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) decreases,
which consequently increases both the bit mismatch rate (Table 2.4) and the packet
drop probabilities (Table 2.5); the increase in packet drop further contributes to an
increase in the time duration between channel measurements. Nevertheless, on the
whole, a comparison of our results in Figure 2.20 and Figure 2.17 shows that secret
keys can be established efficiently even with low-powered, mobile devices.
2.10 Related Work
This paper advances the research area [35, 36, 37, 20, 38, 39, 29, 40, 41] of
generation of shared secret keys from the observation and processing of radio channel
parameters.
Amplitude or channel gain is the most common reciprocal channel feature used
for secret generation in the literature [19, 21, 30, 22, 16, 20]. Amplitude can be
measured more easily than time delay or phase on most existing hardware, and thus is
more readily applicable to common wireless networks. In this paper, we similarly use
measurements of amplitude, based on their universal availability in wireless networks.
In [41], several bidirectional UWB measurements are made and used to compute
the number of secret bits which could be generated. In [21], an implementation using
4We borrowed the code for RSS extraction for Android smartphones from Jessica Croft [34].
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the universal software radio peripheral (USRP) and GNU software radio generates and
receives the required multicarrier signal and evaluates the secret bit rate of the system.
In [22], researchers use a steerable directional antenna in combination with Zigbee
radio hardware to generate a secret between two nodes and test what an eavesdropper
would have received. In [20], Mathur et al. implement two different systems, one using
channel impulse response and another using amplitude measurements, to generate
secret keys and test how an eavesdropper’s measurements differ from the original
measurements. Our work differs from Mathur’s in the following significant ways.
First, we perform extensive real-world measurements in a variety of environments
and settings to determine the effectiveness of RSS-based secret key extraction. Sec-
ond, we propose an adaptive secret key extraction scheme that instead of dropping
mismatched bits, uses information reconciliation to reduce the mismatched bits and
also uses privacy amplification. Third, we expose the problem of a predictable channel
attack. Last, we further increase the secret bit rate by extracting multiple bits from
each RSS measurement.
Bloch et al. [28] and Ye et al. [42] present an alternative multiple bit extraction
scheme that is strongly tied to their use of a low-density parity-check (LDPC)-based
error correction mechanism, which allows them to exploit the correlation between the
bits of each sample for error correction. Our work differs from Bloch et al. [28]
and Ye et al. [42] in the following ways. First, Bloch et al. conclude that the
memory requirements and the complexity of such LDPC-based schemes may be
too high, especially for low-cost systems, while the Cascade [17]-based information
reconciliation mechanism in our ASBG scheme has very low memory requirements
and is much less complex than the LDPC-based schemes. Second, these LDPC-based
schemes rely on redundant/over-quantized bits for error correction; they extract M
bits from each sample, where M is at least log2K, and K denotes the number of
unique, discrete-valued measurements; in our multiple bit quantization, on the other
hand, we extract at most blog2Kc bits from each sample. Hence, in our scheme,
we do not extract more bits per sample than what is indicated by the upper bound
on the actual information content / entropy present in the measurements, which
equals log2K. Third, it is possible to calculate the fraction of information that is
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leaked with Cascade for a given bit mismatch rate, and our privacy amplification
stage appropriately reduces the output secret key size depending on this fraction of
information leakage.
2.11 Conclusion
We evaluated the effectiveness of secret key extraction from the received signal
strength (RSS) variations in wireless channels using extensive real-world measure-
ments in a variety of environments and settings. Our experimental results showed
that bits extracted in static environments are unsuitable for generating a secret key.
We also found that an adversary can cause predictable key generation in static
environments. However, bits extracted in dynamic environments showed a much
higher secret bit rate. We developed an environment adaptive secret key generation
scheme and our measurements showed that our scheme performed the best in terms
of generating high entropy bits at a high bit rate in comparison to the existing ones
that we evaluated. The secret key bit streams generated by our scheme also passed
the randomness tests of the NIST test suite that we conducted. We were able to
further enhance the rate of secret bit generation of our scheme by extracting multiple
bits from each RSS measurement. We have presented these results in two major
papers [14, 43]. The conclusions drawn in this work, specifically the predictable
channel attack, are primarily for secret key extraction using RSS measurements,
and these may not directly apply to key extraction using channel impulse response
measurements. We would like to explore this in our future work. In this chapter, we
have described our work on secret key extraction between a pair of wireless nodes;
in the next chapter, we explore the use of two groups of wireless sensor nodes for
extracting stronger keys in an efficient manner.
Figure 2.1. Secret key extraction process. a - RSS measurements, b - quantized
bits, c - reconciled bits, d - secret bits.
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Figure 2.2. A sample quantizer. Measurements above the upper threshold encoded
as bit ”1”; those below the lower threshold encoded as bit ”0”; others are discarded.
For this set of measurements, the quantizer outputs 111110011...
Figure 2.3. Underground concrete tunnel measurements. Note that Alice and Bob
exchange about 20 probe packets per second for collecting the measurements.
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Figure 2.4. Engineering building gallery measurements














































































Figure 2.10. Measurements across a busy road
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Figure 2.11. Schematic of the attack. In the top portion of this figure, there is a
line of sight path. In the bottom portion, the attacker intermittently blocks the line
of sight path causing a predictable drop in the RSS values.
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Figure 2.12. Predictable variations of the RSS values when an adversary repeatedly
blocks and unblocks the line of sight path using an intermediate object.
Figure 2.13. Measurements from heterogeneous devices while walking inside an
engineering building
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Figure 2.14. Variation of bit mismatch rate against block size for ASBG method.
Figure 2.15. Entropy comparison between existing quantization schemes and ASBG
under various settings.
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Figure 2.16. Bit mismatch rate comparison
Figure 2.17. Secret bit rate comparison
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Figure 2.18. Bit mismatch rate comparison
Table 2.1. P-values from NIST statistical test suite results. Experiments
{A,B,C} ∈ stationary category.
Test A B C
Frequency 0.35 0.03 0.51
Block Frequency 0.52 0.57 0.82
Cumulative sums(Fwd) 0.46 0.05 0.78
Cumulative sums (Rev) 0.27 0.03 0.46
Runs 0.21 0.54 0.74
longest run of ones 0.08 0.1 0.49
FFT 0.71 0.74 0.28
Approx. Entropy 0.06 0.34 0.56
Serial 0.84, 0.50 0.40, 0.23 0.84, 0.64
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Table 2.2. P-values from NIST statistical test suite results. Experiments
{D,E, F} ∈ mobile category.
Test D E F
Frequency 0.14 0.51 0.37
Block Frequency 0.66 0.38 0.94
Cumulative sums(Fwd) 0.19 0.34 0.68
Cumulative sums (Rev) 0.09 0.89 0.39
Runs 0.41 0.74 0.38
longest run of ones 0.65 0.76 0.40
FFT 0.59 0.51 0.52
Approx. Entropy 0.67 0.65 0.21
Serial 0.50, 0.59 0.50, 0.64 0.43, 0.59




Block Frequency 0.63 0.03
Cumulative sums(Fwd) 0.55 0.18
Cumulative sums (Rev) 0.52 0.21
Runs 0.55 0.07
longest run of ones 0.78 0.96
FFT 0.23 0.65
Approx. Entropy 0.55 0.25
Serial 0.60, 0.36 0.16, 0.50
Table 2.4. Bit mismatch rate as a function of distance.







Figure 2.19. Secret bit rate comparison when extracting different number of bits
under various settings.
Figure 2.20. Secret bits per probe as a function of distance.
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Table 2.5. Packet loss rate as a function of distance.












Secret key establishment between a pair of nodes, each of which has a single-input
and single-output (SISO) radio, is evaluated extensively in the previous chapter. In
this chapter, we investigate secret key extraction under a multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO)-like setup using two groups of wireless sensor nodes. Recently, the
use of MIMO has been proposed for enhancing secret key extraction. Wallace et
al. [44] present an analytical study and simulation results on the use of multiple
antennas for secret key extraction, but they assume that multiple antennas belong
to the same node. However, due to size and power limitations, sensor nodes do not
typically have multiple antennas. In this part of our work, we propose to obtain
the multi-antenna capability through collaboration among sensor nodes such that we
leverage the variations in the wireless channels between all possible pairs of nodes
among two groups of sensors to extract secret keys at a very high rate and also in
an energy efficient manner. Furthermore, unlike MIMO-based schemes, our research
does not make any assumptions of phase synchronization of RF signals.
In our new approach, multiple sensors collaborate in exchanging probe packets and
collecting channel measurements. Specifically, there are two groups of sensors, with
one group representing Alice and another Bob. When one of Alice’s nodes transmits
a probe packet, all the nodes (say N) belonging to Bob simultaneously receive the
packet and measure the received signal strength (RSS) values. Alice’s nodes take
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turn to transmit their probes. This is followed by probes from Bob’s nodes (also
N). The simultaneous collection of measurements across different nodes allows us
to extract secret bits at a much faster rate and also considerably reduce the energy
consumption. Essentially, measurements from multiple channels have a substantially
higher differential entropy compared to the measurements from a single channel,
thereby resulting in more randomness in the information source for key extraction,
and this in turn produces stronger secret keys.
We note that the increase in the number of nodes per group, with sensor nodes
taking turns to transmit, can reduce the sampling rate of each wireless channel. Fur-
thermore, this can cause a significant time gap between bidirectional measurements
between nodes across the two groups. This reduced sampling rate and increased time
gap results in a high bit mismatch rate between the nodes performing bidirectional
measurements because the rate at which the measurements are taken is lower than the
rate of change of the channel. There is a fundamental trade-off between the quadratic
increase in the number of measurements of the channels due to multiple nodes per
group versus a linear reduction in sampling rate and a linear increase in the time gap.
The exploration of this trade-off is an important contribution of this chapter.
To experimentally evaluate collaborative secret key extraction in wireless sensor
networks, we first build a simple, yet flexible testbed with multiple TelosB sensor
nodes. We employ an interpolation technique [45] to substantially reduce the bit
mismatch rate. We perform large-scale experiments with different configurations
of collaboration with N ranging from 1 to 5. Specifically, we perform slow-walk
experiments, and iRobot experiments. In the slow-walk experiments, all Bob nodes,
fixed on a cardboard, are carried around at a normal walking speed. In the iRobot
experiments, Bob nodes are fixed onto the rim of an iRobot rotation platform that
is rotated at roughly a constant rate. Alice remains stationary in all experiments.
As expected, our experimental results show that, for both type of experiments, there
is a substantial improvement in the differential entropy estimate of the information
source, almost quadratic in the number of nodes. Our experiments also show that
for the iRobot experiments, in comparison to the 1 × 1 configuration, collaboration
(i) increases the rate of extraction of secret key bits per probe up to 332%, and (ii)
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increases the rate of extraction of secret key bits per mJ of transmission energy up
to 319%, with the maximum achieved when N = 4 for both the measures. In the
slow-walk experiment, the increase in the corresponding secret bit rates is much lower,
but the maximum is achieved at N = 2.
We propose and implement a hierarchical collaborative approach, that in addition
to using space diversity, also exploits frequency diversity to extract stronger secret
keys at an even faster rate. Using measurements from real-world experiments, we
show that the hierarchical approach substantially improves the performance and is
best suited for key extraction.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe our
simple collaborative secret key extraction approach. Section 3.3 presents our hierar-
chical collaborative approach. We present the benefits of distributing the different
stages of secret key extraction among different nodes in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 shows
how a group of nodes can generate group keys. Our experimental setup is discussed
in Section 3.6. We present the results for our simple collaboration and hierarchical
collaboration approaches respectively in Section 3.7 and Section 3.8. We summarize
our main results in Section 3.9. We discuss the related work in Section 3.10 and
present our conclusions in Section 3.11.
3.2 Simple Collaboration
In this section, we describe our efficient collaborative secret key extraction ap-
proach. There are two groups of sensor nodes, with each group associated to an
aggregator / access point. Assume that there are N nodes in each group. There are
several ways in which the access points, or the group of nodes, can establish a secret
key among them. In the most naive approach, the access points exchange a set of
probe packets, collect RSS measurements, and use the secret key extraction process
discussed in Section 2.3 to extract the secret key bits. In this approach, in order for a
node to record N2 measurements, the other node needs to transmit N2 probe packets.
In simple collaboration, a set of N nodes under each access point participates
in the exchange of probe packets and collects RSS measurements. Whenever some
node Sai, i ∈ {1, · · ·N}, belonging to Alice, transmits a probe packet, all the N nodes
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Sbj,∀j ∈ {1, · · ·N}, belonging to Bob, receive the probe packet, and record an RSS
measurement. Thus, with N nodes at each end, and for each transmission from each
Sai, i ∈ {1, · · ·N}, i.e., for a collective transmission of N probe packets from Alice,
Bob can collectively record N2 measurements. An example of this approach with
N = 3 nodes is shown in Figure 3.1.
Assume that there is a secure channel already in place between an access point
and its group of associated nodes. We recognize the following two alternatives for
establishing a secure channel between an access point and its sensor nodes.
First, as described in our previous work [14], two nodes, a sensor node and
its access point, can establish an information-theoretically strong secret key using
variations in the wireless channel characteristics. Alternatively, we can assume that
the AP and its associated sensor nodes are physically very close. Thus, they are able
to communicate via other physical layers than the longer-range physical layer used to
communicate between APs, for example, via infrared. Because of the short distance,
we believe it is reasonable to assume a secure pre-existing channel between AP and its
sensors, even though a rigorous demonstration that this is indeed possible is beyond
the scope of the present chapter.
Using a secure channel, established through one of the above methods, each sensor
node can share its set of measurements with its corresponding access point, in the
following three different ways.
• In the first approach, the nodes piggyback the payload of probe packets with
measurements from the previous round. These piggybacked measurements are
encrypted with a key shared between the node and its access point. The
receiving nodes in the other group, their access point, or an eavesdropper can
only record the RSS value for the received probe packet, but cannot decrypt
the payload. When the associated access point, however, receives the same
probe packet, it decrypts the payload to obtain the RSS measurements from
the previous round, and stores them for later use.
• In the second approach, each node locally caches all the measurements until
the RSS measurements collection phase is over. Then, it encrypts all the
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measurements and sends a single packet containing all the measurements to
the access point.
• In the third approach, instead of sending all the measurements to the access
point, nodes share the quantized bits over the secure channel. We further discuss
this approach in Section 3.4.
The simple collaborative method for exchanging probe packets and recording RSS
measurements is shown in Algorithm 1. When the nodes in each group share the
measurements/quantized bits with their corresponding access point, the access points
use the key extraction process that we have outlined in Section 2.3 to establish a secret
key between them.
There are two principal advantages with the collaboration approach in comparison
to the naive approach. First, since it exploits channel variations across N2 different
bidirectional channels, there is more diversity / variety in the set of measurements
Alice (or Bob) collects. We show in Section 3.7 that the differential entropy of a
set of measurements that is collected using multiple nodes rises quadratically in the
number of nodes in each group. So, a set of measurements from multiple channels is
a better source of information for key extraction, and hence, it is likely to produce
stronger keys in comparison to the naive approach. Second, since there is a reduction
in the number of transmissions by a factor of N , we can expect to extract bits at
a faster rate, and in an energy efficient manner. Through 10 different experiments,
we show in Section 3.7 that we can achieve substantial improvements in terms of the
number of secret bits extracted - per second, - per probe transmission, and - per mJ
of transmission energy.
The quadratic increase in the number of channel measurements, however, comes
with a linear reduction in the sampling rate and linear increase in the time gap be-
tween bidirectional measurements between nodes across the two groups (Section 3.7.3).
The increase in time gap reduces the mutual information between a pair of measure-
ments in each direction, resulting in high rate of bit mismatches. So, the number
of useful secret bits extracted in the process becomes limited when N becomes
sufficiently high (Section 3.7.6).
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3.3 Hierarchical Collaboration
While there are several inherent advantages with simple collaboration, we will see
in Section 3.7 that this method achieves peak performance for relatively small values
of N , and hence is not very scalable. Further, the simple collaboration approach
exploits only space diversity - i.e., different nodes are spread over an area operating
in the same frequency channel. Typically, the sensor nodes are designed to operate
over a number of channels with different carrier frequencies. For example, in the
802.15.4 standard, there are 16 channels in the 2.4 GHz band, each 2 MHz wide, and
with a spacing of 5 MHz between the center frequencies of adjacent channels. Such
nonoverlapping channels allow for nodes operating in different channels to transmit
simultaneously without causing any collisions. Therefore, if the sensor nodes can
exploit both space diversity and frequency diversity simultaneously, it is possible to
extract secret keys in an even more efficient manner.
In hierarchical collaboration, the N nodes in each group are further subdivided
into smaller subgroups, with equal number of nodes, Ns in each subgroup. Each one
of these N
Ns
subgroups is assigned to operate over a different frequency channel for the
duration of the key extraction process. The nodes in each pair of subgroups assigned
to the same frequency channel collaborate (using simple collaboration) in collecting
the RSS measurements, where one of the subgroups in the pair belongs to Alice and
the other subgroup in the pair belongs to Bob. The hierarchical collaboration method
is shown in Algorithm 2. Since different subgroup pairs are assigned to different
frequency channels, it enables all such pairs to operate in parallel. As a result, we
can expect to extract keys at a faster rate. Figure 3.2 shows an example with N = 4
nodes, with the first 2 nodes in each group assigned to frequency channel 1, while the
remaining 2 nodes in each group are assigned to a different frequency channel 2.
While a static frequency assignment to the different subgroups, as we have de-
scribed above, allows for faster key extraction, this approach exploits the variations
of only N2s × NNs = Ns × N different channels. Recall that the simple collabora-
tion approach, however, exploits variations in all the N2 channels. So, in order
to obtain measurements from all the N2 channels in the hierarchical approach as
well, we propose that different subgroups of either Bob or Alice periodically switch
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between the different available frequency channels, for example, after every np packet
transmissions. The frequency switch algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3.
As a consequence of hierarchical subgrouping, the N
Ns
subgroups and the corre-
sponding access point operate at different frequencies. As a result, nodes cannot share
the measurements with the corresponding access points through the piggybacking
approach that we have described earlier. To overcome this, the nodes have to cache
the measurements and either share them with the access point after the measurements
collection phase, or quantize the collected measurements and exchange only the
quantized bits, which is addressed next in Section 3.4.
3.4 Distributed Key Extraction Stages
In the simple and hierarchical collaborative key extraction approaches we have
described thus far, all the 4 stages, namely, interpolation, quantization, information
reconciliation and privacy amplification, are assumed to be carried out at the access
point, and the sensor nodes in each group / subgroup take part only in collecting the
measurements. Alternatively, it is possible to distribute the various stages among
different nodes and extract keys in an efficient manner. In the distributed key
extraction approach, interpolation and quantization are carried out at each node,
while information reconciliation and privacy amplification are carried out at the
access point. Doing so allows each node to send only the quantized bits, and avoid
exchanging a lot of measurements with the access point. Therefore, the distributed
approach speeds up key extraction in the following ways - (i) by significantly reducing
the amount of information that needs to be exchanged between the nodes and the
access point, and (ii) by distributing the computational tasks (of interpolation and
quantization) across different nodes.
Let K denote the expectation of the number of quantized bits contributed by
each node to the key extraction process. Assuming that the measurements follow
a Gaussian distribution, it can be easily shown that to obtain K quantized bits,
each node needs to record M = K
2×Q(α) measurements, where Q(y) denotes the
complementary cumulative distribution function of a Gaussian random variable Y ,
with zero mean and unit variance. In the undistributed approach, to contribute K
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quantized bits to the key extraction process, each node needs to sendM measurements
to the access point, where each measurement represents 1 byte of information. In the
distributed key extraction approach, each node needs to send just K bits to the access
point. For example, to contribute K = 32 quantized bits, and when α = 0.4, for
instance, the amount of information exchanged between a node and its access point is
just 32 bits, or 4 bytes for the distributed case, and ≈ 46 bytes for the undistributed
case.
3.5 Group Key Generation
Nitinawarat et al. [46] consider secret key generation for a pairwise independent
network (PIN) model. The objective is to generate a secret key shared by a given
subset A of terminals in M = {1, · · ·m} using the cooperation of the other remaining
terminals. The PIN model is motivated by the practical aspects of wireless com-
munication - that the reciprocal wireless channel between two terminals decorrelate
with time (of the order of coherence interval) and distance (of the order of a few
wavelengths). In an earlier work, [47] show that the largest rate at which terminals
in A can generate secrecy, with the help of remaining terminals, is obtained by
subtracting from the total joint entropy the smallest rate of communication which
enables each terminal in A to reconstruct all the m components of the multiple
source. Nitinawarat et al. [46] express the secret key capacity for the PIN model in
terms of a linear combination of mutual information terms that involve only mutually
independent pairs of reciprocal random variables.
Based on the maximal packing of Steiner trees in a multigraph, Nitinawarat
et al. [46] propose an algorithm for propagating pairwise secret keys for a pair of
terminals in M to form a group-wide secret key for the terminals in A. Specifically,
for edges (i, j) and (i, j′), vertex i in the Steiner tree broadcasts to vertices j, j′, the
binary sum of two independent secret key bits - one with j and the other with j′.
This enables i, j, j′ to share any of these two bits with the attribute that the shared
bit is independent of the binary sum; this propagation also enables all the vertices in
A, which are connected in the Steiner tree, to share one bit among them.
In the following, we argue on how we can achieve the secret key capacity bounds
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of Nitinawarat et al. when one group of nodes collaborates in sharing a group secret
key.
(i) It has been shown using real-world measurements by Mathur et al. [20] and
Zeng et al. [24] that Alice and Bob share enough mutual information to extract one
or two bits from each measurement in the quantization stage. Consistent with these
observations from earlier work, we also extract at most one bit from each measurement
depending upon whether the measurement lies within or beyond the upper and lower
thresholds.
(ii) We have shown that measurements from different channels have very low
correlation (Section 3.6.3). Under Gaussian assumption, lack of correlation between
different components of a random vector also implies mutual independence between
those components. Therefore, our RSS measurements from different channels can be
considered to be mutually independent.
(iii) For group key extraction problem, Nitinawarat et al. expressed secret key
capacity as a linear combination of mutual information terms that involve mutually
independent pairs of reciprocal random variables.
If the nodes in our setup exchange the secret bits that they have extracted with
the other nodes using the Steiner graph approach of Nitinawarat et al. in order to
share a group-wide secret key, then it follows from (i) and (ii) that we have met the
conditions to satisfy the secret key capacity bounds on (iii).
3.6 Experimental Setup
We use Crossbow TelosB wireless sensors for our experiments. TelosB mote is
a low power wireless sensor module equipped with an IEEE 802.15.4-compliant RF
transceiver (the TI CC2420), built-in antenna, and a microcontroller. The motes are
programmed to exchange probe packets and collect RSS measurements, as described
by Wilson et al. [48]. This sensor network platform allows us to readily explore the
impact of using multiple sensors on secret key extraction.
In this work, we use 2N , N ∈ {1, . . . , 5} sensors operating on batteries, divided
into two groups of N each representing Alice and Bob. Another sensor connected
to a laptop acts as a base station that collects data from all the other 2N battery
powered sensors; i.e., in our experimental setup, the access points are colocated, and
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the measurements are exchanged over an insecure channel for evaluation purposes.
Nodes representing Alice are numbered 0 to (N − 1) and those representing Bob are
numbered N to (2N − 1). Node numbered (i+ 1) mod 2N transmits a probe packet
after it hears a probe packet sent from node numbered i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ (2N − 1).
With this setup, one cycle of probe exchanges between Alice and Bob is shown in
Figure 3.3.
We choose to perform our experiments in a dynamic environment, where one set
of nodes is constantly moving and/or rotating and which has several intermediate
objects. In such an environment, the presence or the absence of line of sight changes
unpredictably over time. Hence, the extracted keys are expected to be unpredictable.
In our earlier work [14], we showed that in static scenarios, when Eve positions herself
strategically on the signal path between Alice and Bob, she can cause the predictable
channel/key generation attack. Thus, our choice of a dynamic environment for the
experiments makes it harder for Eve to cause such attacks.
For each N ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, we perform two kinds of experiments - slow-walk and
iRobot rotation experiments. Our experimental setup is shown in Figure 3.4. In all
our experiments, all the N nodes of both Alice and Bob are arranged in a circular
pattern (radius ≈ 15 cm), as shown in Figure 3.4, and Alice remains stationary in all
the experiments. In the slow-walk experiments, all the nodes representing Bob are
fixed on a board and are carried around in a student lab at normal walking speed
while maintaining a distance of about 1 − 5 m between the nodes of Alice and Bob.
In the iRobot rotation experiments, all the nodes representing Bob are fixed onto the
rim of a remote controlled iRobot Create rotation platform. The iRobot is rotated
at a roughly constant rate of about 22 rotations per minute, and a distance of about
3 m is maintained between the nodes of Alice and Bob.
Note that in our iRobot experiments, in order for two rotating, neighboring nodes
(in the circular arrangement of TelosB sensors) to record similar RSS variations, they
have to rotate at a very high speed and also rotate exactly into one another’s positions.
Neither of these two things happens in our experiments. In our rotation experiments,
the iRobot completes about 22 rotations per minute, which is a very low speed and
does not even come close to the rate at which the channel changes.
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Secondly, note that while the TelosB sensors are fixed onto the rim of the iRobot
platform, the iRobot itself is not fixed on the ground in order to allow for its rotation.
However, while rotating, the iRobot also moves a very small distance sideways1.
Therefore, it is highly unlikely for any two nodes to rotate into one another’s positions.
Consequently, the measurements from our experiments are not duplicated due to
rotation.
In our evaluations, we assign all the nodes to use channel 11 (2.405 GHz) in the
case of simple collaboration (Section 6.1). For evaluating hierarchical collaboration,
we divide the nodes of Alice/Bob into two subgroups and assign channels 11 (2.405
GHz) and 21 (2.455 GHz), respectively, for these two different subgroups (Section
6.2). We set the transmission power on each TelosB sensor so that it does not change
with the environment. This transmission power (0 dBm) is the highest available on
the TelosB mote.
Table 3.1 shows the total number of probe packets exchanged between the nodes
of Alice and Bob in each of our experiments. The Spin program [48] detects packet
losses using timeouts. When node numbered (i+ 1) mod 2N fails to receive a probe
packet from node numbered i within the timeout period, where 0 ≤ i ≤ (2N − 1),
node numbered (i + 1) mod 2N goes ahead with its packet transmission. In our
experiments, we use a timeout period of 25 ms. In our work, we utilize a cycle of
probe packets, only if there are no packet losses in that cycle. Table 3.2 shows the
fraction of probe packets that we utilize for key extraction in each of our experiments.
It turns out that on average, 98.52% of the probe packets are utilized in the key
extraction process.
3.6.1 Interpolation Stage
A prequantization stage called interpolation is used in the work of Patwari et
al. [45] to reduce the probability of bit mismatch between the bits of Alice and Bob.
In this work, we also use interpolation to considerably reduce the probability of bit
mismatch so that the information reconciliation stage reveals a lesser fraction of
information.
1This distance is very small in comparison to the distance between Alice and Bob.
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When Alice and Bob use time-duplex transceivers, there will be a short delay
between the time instants when Alice and Bob measure the channel, which introduces
asymmetry inbetween their measurements. Interpolation addresses this asymmetry
by estimating the measurements of Alice and Bob at common time instants. Let
TR denote the time delay between two subsequent measurements of Alice (or Bob).
Let τa(i) and τb(i) denote the time instants at which Alice and Bob record the i
th








; where τa(i) < τb(i) (3.1)
If Alice delayed its ith measurement by (1 + µ)TR, and Bob delayed its measure-
ments by (1− µ)TR, we would have simultaneous estimates for the ith measurement.
We use the cubic Farrow filter implementation [45] to compute these estimates, which
become the input to the quantization stage.
The complete process of wireless RSS-based secret key extraction that we use in
wireless sensor networks, unless we specify otherwise, is shown in Figure 3.5.
The fractional sampling offset, µ, as defined above is applicable only when there
is a single channel between Alice and Bob. When there are multiple channels, the
fractional sampling offset depends on a specific node-pair, because over a duration of
one sampling period, the measurements on each channel are made at different time
instants, as shown in Figure 3.3.
Let a and b be two sensors belonging to Alice and Bob, respectively. Assume that
a ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} and b ∈ {N, . . . , 2N − 1}. Then, the fractional sampling offset to









As an example, Figure 3.3 shows the computation of µ05, and the subsequent
delays, which node 5 and node 0 must use to estimate the measurements on channel
“0, 5” and channel “5, 0” at the same time instant.
2The fractional sampling offset µ used in interpolation is different from µ in µ± (α × σ), which
represent the quantization thresholds.
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3.6.2 Reducing the Effects of Shadow Fading
In this section, we show that applying a running average filter to the channel
measurements effectively removes the effects of shadow fading, which are caused
by obstructions in the environment. Thus, the secret key bits that are obtained
ultimately are primarily due to the hard-to-predict effects of fast-fading (or small-scale
fading), which are caused because of the relative motion between the radios and the
different objects in the environment.
We use the [49] statistical model, which provides an exponentially-decaying corre-
lation for the shadow fading signal. The autocorrelation function of the Gudmundson
shadow fading signal is represented as RA(k) = σ
2a|k|, where a = vT/DD . Here σ
2, D,
v and T represent the variance, correlation between two points separated by distance
D, speed, and sampling period, respectively.
Since the autocorrelation function, RA(k), and the power spectral density, SA(φ),
are discrete Fourier transform pairs according to the discrete-time Wiener-Khintchine





1 + a2 − 2a cos(2piφ)
]
. (3.3)




+ δn−M if n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2M}
0 otherwise
(3.4)
where δn represents the Kronecker delta function, which equals 1 for n = 0 and 0
otherwise.
The magnitude-square of the transfer function of the running average filter, |H(φ)|2
is expressed as follows,
|H (φ) |2 = 1− 2
(2M + 1)
[











We find the power spectral density of the shadow fading signal using the following
parameter values: σ2 = 0.40, D = 1 m and D = 0.16, which were obtained as a
result of extensive measurements by [51]. For slow-walk experiments, v = 0.8889
m/s, which corresponds to a speed of approximately 2 miles per hour. For rotation
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experiments, we determine the linear speed using the relationship: v = rω, when a
node is rotating on a circle of radius r m at a rotational rate of ω radian per second.
In our rotation experiments, r = 0.15 m and ω = 22 rotations per minute = (44/60)pi
radian/s; correspondingly, v = 0.3456 m/s. The average sampling period, T , for the
different setups is shown in Table 3.3.
Plotting the power spectral density of the Gudmundson shadow fading signal, we
find that it is essentially low pass, where as the running average filter is a high pass
filter. The 3 dB bandwidth of the shadow fading signal depends on the speed at which
the nodes move as well as the channel sampling rate. The 3 dB low cutoff frequency of
the running average filter depends on the size of the window (2M + 1) over which the
running average of the measurements is calculated. If the parameter M is carefully
chosen depending on the speed and the sampling rate, it can be ensured that the low
cutoff frequency of the running average filter is greater than the bandwidth of the
shadow fading signal, thereby significantly removing the effects of shadow fading.
We determine the running average filter parameter M for the different setups. For
example, Figure 3.6 shows the power spectral density of the shadow fading signal for
the 3 × 3 and 4 × 4 cases and the magnitude-square of the transfer function of the
running average filter for M = 24 and M = 18. When M = 24 for the 3×3 slow-walk
configuration (M = 18 for 4× 4 slow-walk configuration), the 3 dB bandwidth of the
shadow fading signal is smaller than the lower cutoff frequency of the running average
filter. Table 3.4 summarizes the M values for different setups. We use these M values
to eliminate the significant components of the shadow fading signal from our secret
key extraction process.
3.6.3 Correlation Coefficient between the Measurements
of Different Channels
We find that there is very low correlation between the measurements on dif-
ferent channels. To show this, we calculate the correlation coefficient, ρMXMY =
cov(MX ,MY )
σMX×σMY
,∀(X 6= Y ), where the random variables MX , MY represent a pair of mea-
surements recorded at the same group but on two different channelsX, Y ; cov(MX ,MY )
denotes the covariance between the random variables MX and MY ; σMX and σMY
denote the standard deviations of the random variables MX and MY , respectively.
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Note that both X and Y represent one of the N2 channels ∈ {1, . . . , N2}, where N
denotes the number of nodes in each group.
Table 3.5 shows the average correlation coefficient, ρMXMY for the different N ×






. The average correlation coefficient is very
low - around 0.2 or less for the slow-walk experiments and around 0.01 or less for
the rotation experiments. These results conclusively show that the knowledge of
measurements on one channel does not help considerably in predicting measurements
on another channel.
For an example, Figure 3.7 shows the complete correlation coefficient matrix, C
for the 3 × 3 case in rotation configuration, where element CXY of the matrix C
equals ρMXMY . As we can see in the figure, the correlation coefficient values for all
the different channel pairs are almost close to zero, demonstrating that it will be
difficult to predict measurements on some channel if we know the measurements on
some other channel.
Important note: Consider a scenario where one of the nodes in the group is
representing the adversary, Eve. In such a case, the above results tell us that even
if Eve can measure some channel, it will not help her considerably in predicting the
measurements on some other channel measured by a legitimate node!
3.6.4 Secret Bit Sequences from Closely-Located Nodes
We first calculate the distances between the closely-located nodes. Consider the
5 TelosB nodes that are arranged in a circular pattern as shown in Figure 3.8. Let p
and q denote the closest and farthest distances between these sensors. We determine
p and q as follows: Since the sum of the interior angles of a triangle equals 180◦,
θs = (180
◦ − θp)/2 and θt = (180◦ − θq)/2. Since there are 5 sensors placed around
the circle with equal angular separation, θp = (360/5)
◦ = 72◦ and θq = 2× θp = 144◦.
Note that the radius of the circle, r ≈ 15cm. Then, applying the law of sines,
p = r × sinθp
sinθs
≈ 1.4λ and q = r × sinθq
sinθt
≈ 2.3λ; where λ ≈ 12.5cm is the wavelength
for signals in the 2.4 GHz band.
Consider the five channels that we have labeled as c1 to c5 in Figure 3.9 for the
5 × 5 case in rotation configuration. Note that these channels are formed using one
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node of Alice and five closely-located nodes of Bob. We apply the process shown in
Section 2.3 for the measurements from each of these channels.
Assume that there are two parties. Each party tosses a fair coin K times and
encodes ’head’ as bit 0 and ’tail’ as bit 1; i.e., each party generates a sequence of bits
independently. Then, in expectation, K/2 (i.e., 50%) of the bits generated by these
parties will match. Table 3.6 shows the percentage of bits that match between the
secret bit sequences of different pairs of channels that we have shown in Figure 3.9.
For example, channel pairs (c1, c2) produce a 47.92% match. Notice that all the
nondiagonal elements in this table are close to 50%. If the secret bit extraction
process is considered as a fair-coin-tossing process, the values in Table 3.6 imply that
the secret bit sequences from different channels are almost mutually independent.
Let the random variables BX , BY (BX ∈ {0, 1}, and BY ∈ {0, 1}) represent a pair
of secret bits that are extracted from two channels X, Y , respectively. Let PBX (bx)
and PBY (by) denote marginal probability distributions of BX and BY , respectively.
Let PBX ,BY (bx, by) denote the joint probability distribution of BX and BY . Then, the
mutual information (I(BX ;BY )) between BX and BY is expressed as follows:





PBX ,BY (bx, by)× log2
(
PBX ,BY (bx, by)
PBX (bx)× PBY (by)
)
(3.6)
Table 3.7 shows the mutual information between the secret bits that are extracted
from different channels that we have shown in Figure 3.9. For example, the secret
bits from channel pairs (c1, c2) have a mutual information of 1.20× 10−3. Notice that
all the nondiagonal elements in this table are negligible, which implies that the secret
bits from different channels are almost mutually independent.
All these observations (percentage of matching bits and mutual information) are
further supported by our findings in Section 3.6.3, in which we have shown that there
is very little correlation between the measurements of different channel pairs.
More importantly, even if Eve manages to plant malicious nodes very close to the
other nodes of Alice/Bob with the hope of obtaining bits similar to those that are
extracted at those nodes of Alice/Bob, it will be a futile attempt because the secret
bits extracted by the nodes of Alice/Bob will be mutually independent from the bits
obtained by Eve.
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3.7 Performance of Simple Collaboration
We show how collaboration benefits key extraction in improving the differential
entropy of RSS measurements in Section 3.7.1. Section 3.7.2 presents the results of
per-bit entropy of secret bits that we calculate using the NIST test suite. The effect of
collaboration on the rate of bit mismatch is discussed in Section 3.7.3. Sections 3.7.4
and 3.7.5 show the improvement in the rates at which the secret bits are extracted
when there are a different number of nodes in each group. Section 3.7.6 presents the
fundamental limits on the performance achievable with simple collaboration.
3.7.1 Approximate Differential Entropy of RSS Measurements
We estimate the quality of the information source (i.e., set of RSS measurements)
for all N ×N cases (N ∈ {1, . . . , 5}) using approximate differential entropy. Higher
entropy implies more randomness in the information source, and vice-versa. Assuming
that the measurements in a wireless channel follow a Gaussian distribution, there are
K = N2 correlated, Gaussian random variables corresponding to each channel in an
N × N configuration. The differential entropy of a multivariate Gaussian random
vector, X = [X1, X2, ..., XK ]




where |Σ| is the determinant of the covariance matrix.
Our differential entropy estimation is an approximation in that the data is assumed
to be multivariate Gaussian. More accurate differential entropy approximations
use higher order cumulants, but they are based on adjustments to the formula for
Gaussian data [52]. Further note that we use approximate differential entropy only
to show the increase in entropy of channel measurements as a function of N , and not
for the estimation of entropy per bit of the output secret bitstream, for which we use
the more accurate NIST test suite.
The covariance matrix for each N ×N configuration is computed using the mea-
surements collected from our experiments. Figure 3.10 shows the approximate dif-
ferential entropy of RSS measurements for the iRobot rotation experiments; similar
results are obtained for the slow-walk experiments. The degree of uncertainty, i.e.,
the differential entropy, increases almost quadratically with N . This shows that a
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set of measurements obtained from multiple wireless channels has more randomness
associated with it in comparison to a set of measurements obtained from just a single
wireless channel. An input source with more randomness is likely to yield an output
secret key bit stream that can be considered more random, and is hence likely to be
stronger. Therefore, whenever there is an opportunity, it is best to use measurements
from multiple wireless channels to generate a secret key.
While the number of channel measurements increases quadratically with N , there
is a linear reduction in the sampling rate and linear increase in the time gap between
bidirectional measurements between nodes across the two groups (Section 3.7.3). The
increase in time gap reduces the mutual information between a pair of measurements
in each direction, resulting in a high rate of bit mismatches. Therefore, the number
of useful secret bits extracted in the process becomes limited when N becomes
sufficiently high (Section 3.7.6).
3.7.2 Entropy of the Output Secret Bits
We estimate the entropy of the output secret key bit streams using NIST test
suite’s approximate entropy test [23]. The approximate entropy of order m, m ≥ 1 is
defined as,
ApEn(m) = Φ(m)− Φ(m+ 1)
where −Φ(m) is the entropy of the empirical distribution arising on the set of all 2m
possible patterns of length m; the NIST test suite recommends appropriate values of
m depending on the length of the bitstream that we test. Notice from Table 3.8 that
the output secret bit streams have an approximate entropy value that is close to the
ideal value of 1, indicating that there is an almost 1 bit of uncertainty associated with
each bit of the extracted secret key.
The privacy amplification stage uses universal hash functions chosen at random
from a publicly known set of such functions, and generates fixed size smaller length
output bit streams from longer input bit streams. These methods are generally based
on leftover hash lemma, which is a well-known technique for obtaining random bits,
i.e., bits with high entropy, from imperfect random sources [18]. The values in Ta-
ble 3.8 that we have obtained using the NIST approximate entropy test represent only
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an estimate of the entropy; even if the entropy achieved with privacy amplification
was 1.0, the estimate of the entropy might not be 1.0.
We test for the randomness of the output secret bit sequences using a number of
different statistical tests, in addition to the approximate entropy test, available in the
NIST test suite [23]. Our secret bit sequences meet the input size recommendation
of only the eight tests we have shown in Table 3.9; most of the other tests available
in the NIST test suite require very large sequences (on the order of 106 bits). Each
test outputs a P-value; the P-value summarizes the strength of the evidence against
the null hypothesis, which corresponds to the fact that the sequence being tested is
random. To pass a test, the P-value for that test must be greater than 0.01, in which
case, the sequence is considered as random with a confidence of 99%. Note that all
the P-values shown in Table 3.9 are at least 0.01, which demonstrates that the secret
bit streams are in fact random with a very high degree of confidence.
3.7.3 Bit Mismatch Rate
Bit mismatch rate is defined as the ratio of the number of bits that do not match
between Alice and Bob to the number of bits extracted from RSS quantization.
Our bit mismatch rate metric differs from the bit error rate metric used in data
communications, which is meant for quantifying the percentage of transmitted bits
that are received in error. Note that for secret key extraction, Alice and Bob do
not actually communicate the quantized bits to one another. Rather they exchange
probe packets, measure the RSS values on these probe packets, and quantize their
measurements to derive their bits. Our bit mismatch rate metric captures the degree
of mismatch between two bit sequences that are not actually exchanged over-the-air.
Note that the bit mismatch rate values that we calculate are based on the bits we
obtain immediately after the quantization stage, and not after the final stage (privacy
amplification) of the secret key extraction process. Even if there is a single mismatch
between the quantized bits of Alice and Bob, the entire bit sequence becomes useless
as a secret key. Therefore, we use Cascade, a well-known information reconciliation
protocol (Section 2.3.2), to correct the potential bit mismatches. Cascade leaks a
certain fraction of information for correcting the bit mismatches. The amount of
information leakage depends on the bit mismatch rate, and it leaks all information
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only when the bit mismatch rate is around 22%.
Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show the bit mismatch rates as a function of α and N ,
for the slow-walk and iRobot rotation experiments, respectively. Recall that α is
the quantization threshold parameter, that defines the quantization thresholds - µ±
(α × σ), and which also controls the amount of measurements censored in the bit
extraction process.
Bit mismatch rate decreases as α increases. When we consider the support of
two correlated random variables, each representing a measurement from Alice and
Bob, it should be clear that the area, where these random variables (when quantized)
disagree, becomes large as the area corresponding to the censored region is reduced.
While it may appear that smaller values of α will yield more secret bits, this is not
always true. The number of bits that we can extract does not continue to increase
when we reduce α beyond an optimal point, as the amount of information leaked
with growing bit mismatch rate offsets the gain in the number of bits that can be
extracted. In fact, as we can notice from Figure 3.11, for slow-walk experiments, at
α = 0.1 and with N = 4 or 5, the bit mismatch rate approaches or exceeds 0.22 - the
rate at which all bits are essentially leaked in the information reconciliation process.
In general, the bit mismatch rate increases with N . There are two contributing
factors for high bit mismatch rates. First, the average time gap between bidirectional
measurement pairs increases with N . For an N × N configuration, this time gap
varies between ∆ and (2N − 1) × ∆ (Figure 3.3 shows this variation for the 3 × 3
case), where ∆ is the time interval between transmissions of node i and node (i+ 1);
0 ≤ i ≤ 2(N − 1). The increase in the time gap reduces the mutual information
between a pair of measurements in each direction, resulting in high bit mismatch
rates. In other words, such large time gaps are likely to introduce more noise, and
hence, high bit mismatch rate as we increase the number of nodes.
Second, the sampling period increases with N . For an N × N configuration, the
sampling period is equal to 2N×∆ (Figure 3.3 shows the sampling period for N = 3).
When N becomes sufficiently large, the channel probing rate falls below the rate of
change of the wireless channel, causing an undersampling effect, leading to high bit
mismatch rates.
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Rotation experiments produce bit streams with lower mismatch rates compared to
the slow-walk experiments. Although both types of experiments are done in similar
kind of setups, there is a notable difference between the rotation and slow-walk exper-
iments. In the slow-walk experiments, the distance between Alice and Bob changes
considerably over time as Bob continues to move along its trajectory. Secondly, for
a large fraction of the time, this distance is also larger than that with the rotation
experiments. Large distance reduces the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR), and hence, the
measurements from slow-walk experiments produce bits with higher mismatch rate.
3.7.4 Secret Bits per Probe
Secret bits per probe is defined as the average number of secret bits extracted per
probe transmission. This rate is measured in terms of final output bits produced after
taking care of bit losses due to information reconciliation and privacy amplification.
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 show the secret bits per probe as a function of bit mismatch
rate and N , for the slow-walk and iRobot rotation experiments, respectively. Com-
paring the peaks in the case of slow-walk experiments, the 2 × 2 case shows about
77% increase in the number of secret bits extracted per probe in comparison to the
1×1 case. A further increase in N does not improve the performance. Comparing the
peaks in the case of rotation experiments, the 2×2, 3×3, and 4×4 cases respectively
show about 160%, 246%, and 332% increase in the number of secret bits extracted
per probe in comparison to the 1 × 1 case. However, the increasing trend does not
continue, as the 5 × 5 case shows an increase of 300%, which is less than the gain
achieved with the 4× 4 case.
3.7.5 Secret Bits per Joule of Transmission Energy
Secret bits per Joule of transmission energy is defined as the average number of
secret bits extracted per Joule of energy consumed in the process of transmitting
a probe packet. This rate is measured in terms of final output bits produced after
taking care of bit losses due to information reconciliation and privacy amplification.
This metric forms the basis for comparing the energy efficiency.
There are three distinct phases involved in the transmission of a probe packet -
(1) copying the packet data from memory to the FIFO buffer on the radio, (2) backoff
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transmission for a random delay when the medium is sensed to be busy, and (3) actual
transmission of the packet. Figure 3.15 depicts these three phases for one sensor in
a 2X2 configuration. In Figure 3.15, the data copying phase extends roughly from
−7 ms to −3 ms; the actual packet transmission phase spans from around 0.15 ms to
1.2 ms, and the node backs off from transmission inbetween these two phases. Note
that copying data consumes slightly more power than the actual packet transmission,
which is also observed in an existing work [53]. Further note that our measurements
closely match with the specifications [54] and existing work [53]. The minor difference
of a few mW between the measurements and the specifications comes from the fact
that the MSP430 microprocessor, which still consumes this small amount of power, is
not turned off during our measurements. Consequently, our measurements are more
realistic and better reflect the operating scenario of the TelosB sensors exchanging
the secret key. Our power measurement experiments also enable us to determine the
durations of the different phases of a packet transmission, which are needed in the
calculation of the total energy consumption, as we describe in this section.
In the Spin program [48], the packet length equals (2N + 6) bytes, where 2N
is the total number of nodes in the network. Correspondingly, the durations of the
data copying and actual packet transmission phases increase with N , which we can
clearly observe from Figure 3.16 and Figure 3.17. For all the N ×N configurations,
the amount of power consumed is roughly the same, but as we increase N , the same
amount of power is consumed for a slightly longer period due to increase in the
packet length. Thus, increasing N slightly increases the energy consumption in the
process of transmitting a probe packet. However, as we shall see in the following, the
reduced number of packet transmissions due to collaborative key extraction actually
contributes to significant reduction in the overall consumption of transmission energy.
Secret bits per Joule of transmission energy is calculated as follows. Let P (t)
denote the power consumed by the sensor at an arbitrary time instant t. Let E
denote the total amount of energy consumed across the aforementioned phases in
transmitting a probe packet. Let t0 denote the time instant at which the data copying
phase (phase 1) is initiated. Let t1, t2, and t3 denote the time instants at which the
phases 1, 2, and 3 get completed, respectively. The duration of phase 2 (random
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backoff) is nondeterministic; i.e., (t2−t1) could vary with each packet transmission. To
ensure that our results are not heavily influenced by this nondeterministic component,
and therefore to provide fair comparison across different number of nodes, we use the
same backoff period in our energy calculations irrespective of the number of nodes.
Correspondingly, the energy consumption over phase 2, Ebp, is treated as a constant,








Let S denote the number of secret bits extracted and k, the number of probe pack-
ets transmitted. Thus, the number of secret bits extracted per Joule of transmission
energy, SJ =
S
k×E bits per Joule.
In the slow-walk experiments, the 2×2 configuration achieves about 75% increase
in secret bits per mJ of Tx energy in comparison to the 1×1 case. A further increase
in N does not improve the performance. In Figure 3.18, we show the secret bits per
mJ of transmission energy as a function of bit mismatch rate and N × N , for the
iRobot rotation experiments. Comparing the peaks, the 2× 2, 3× 3 and 4× 4 cases
respectively show about 158%, 239%, and 319% increase in the number of secret bits
extracted per mJ of transmission energy in comparison to the 1×1 case. However, the
increasing trend does not continue to the 5× 5 case. Nevertheless, from Figure 3.18,
we can clearly see that collaboration is significantly energy efficient in comparison to
the 1× 1 case.
Note: The reduced energy consumption is further split among N different nodes,
implying that the battery on each sensor will last substantially longer because of
collaboration.
3.7.5.1 Energy Efficiency when Probe Packet Size Is
Constant
We have noted earlier that in the SPIN program [48], the packet length and
therefore its transmission delay increases with N . However, it is possible to construct
probe packets whose size is independent of N . We evaluate the energy efficiency in
using probe packets that are two bytes long. Note that sixteen bits are long enough
to encode the node id of the sender, and the piggybacked, encrypted quantized bits,
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for all values of N we use in this work. Figure 3.19 shows our estimates of the peak
secret bits per mJ of Tx energy vs N . A smaller, constant sized packet improves
energy efficiency only marginally. It shows that changing the size of probe packets
that a TelosB sensor transmits has only a minor impact on the energy consumption.
3.7.6 Trade-off Discussion
Since differential entropy increases with N , collaboration enables the extraction
of stronger secret keys by increasing the number of nodes. However, this increasing
trend is not reflected in the case of secret bit rates beyond specific values of N . Notice
from Figures 3.13, 3.14, and 3.18 that, for each N , the secret bit rate (per probe, or
per Joule of Tx energy) starts increasing until some point and then starts declining.
We find that these secret bit rates peak at an optimal α value, which lies in the range
of 0.3−0.7, and then starts diminishing on either side of this optimal point. For each
N , the secret bit rates do not continue to increase when we reduce α beyond this
optimal point, as the amount of information leaked with growing bit mismatch rate
offsets the gain in the number of bits that we can extract.
When we consider the peak secret bit rates across different values of N , we find
remarkable improvements only up to some value of N , i.e., the secret bit rates peak at
a point (at N = 4 and N = 2 for rotation and slow-walk experiments, respectively),
and then start declining. We identify this declining behavior to be a result of high bit
mismatch rates which offset the gain in the number of secret bits that we can extract.
Thus, there is a clear trade-off in using simple collaboration for extracting secret
keys. We capture this trade-off in Figure 3.20. While we obtain stronger secret keys
with increasing N , the secret bit rates peak at relatively small values of N .
3.7.7 Performance under Constant Sampling Rate
We have seen the performance of simple collaboration as a function of N , for the
case where the channel sampling rate decreases linearly with N , from Section 3.7.1
to Section 3.7.6. In this subsection, we show the performance for the case when the
sampling rate is the same for all values of N . We find that in such a setup, there
is higher bit mismatch rate in comparison to the setups we have considered thus
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far. To solve this problem, we introduce a distillation stage3 in our key extraction
methodology comprising the quantization, information reconciliation, and privacy
amplification stages. The distillation stage, introduced between the quantization
and the information reconciliation stages, iteratively improves the output from the
quantizer by eliminating measurements that are likely to cause mismatching bits at
Alice and Bob. This stage ensures that the percentage of mismatching bits is low
enough to be handled by information reconciliation without compromising security.
In fact, without the distillation stage, the information reconciliation stage by itself is
unable to reconcile the bit mismatch.
3.7.7.1 Experimental Setup
We conduct a few experiments in a student lab to evaluate the effectiveness of
distillation. Nodes representing Alice remain stationary in one corner of the lab while
the other set of nodes (Bob) is carried around at normal walking speed. The distance
between Alice and Bob is maintained between 2 m - 8 m. Nodes of Alice and Bob
are arranged in two parallel rows, with each sensor separated from its neighbor by
a distance of about 12 cm, which is greater than the de-correlation distance of 6.25
cm for signals transmitted in the 2.4 GHz band. This ensures that the measurements
collected at neighboring nodes are mutually uncorrelated. Therefore, we use the
secret bit extraction process (shown in Figure 3.21) separately for each one of the N2
channels, where N represents the number of nodes at Alice/Bob. We extract two bits
from each RSS measurement that we collect in this setup.
3.7.7.2 Prohibitively High Bit Mismatch
When using multiple sensors, we find that the bit mismatch rate is significantly
higher in comparison to our earlier experiments that use 802.11 single antenna sys-
tems. Note that for a mismatch rate of about 22%, the information reconciliation
protocol essentially reveals all the bits. Therefore, the collected measurements that
exhibit very high bit mismatch are not useful in establishing a secret key.
3The distillation stage as described in this work does not involve any exchange of parity
information, and is different from the advantage distillation in quantum cryptography.
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We identify the following reasons for such high mismatch rates. First, when mul-
tiple nodes take turn in exchanging probe packets, it increases the average time-gap
between any pair of measurements taken in each direction of a channel, and also
reduces the probing rate on each channel. Both these factors contribute in increasing
the bit mismatch rate. This is also verified in a plot of bit mismatch rate vs channel
distance, where channel distance is the absolute difference between the node ids (as
defined by the token ring order) of the transmitting and receiving sensors. Figure 3.22
clearly shows the general increase in mismatch rate with channel distance. Time-gap
between each unidirectional measurement pair is proportional to the channel distance.
So, mismatch rate increases with channel distance/multiple antennas.
Second, channels in 802.15.4 are much narrower in comparison to 802.11. A
nonreciprocal deep fade (perhaps due to strong interference only at Alice) occurring
on a narrow channel significantly reduces the average RSS computed at Alice while
not affecting much at Bob. This results in a greater likelihood of asymmetry in
measurements, and therefore higher bit mismatch when using narrow channel mea-
surements.
3.7.7.3 Distillation
To address the problem of very high bit mismatch rates, we augment the secret
key extraction process with the distillation stage. Distillation ensures that the per-
centage of mismatching bits is low enough for information reconciliation to correct the
differences without revealing all the extracted bits. Figure 3.21 shows the distillation
stage in relation to the other stages of the key extraction process.
Plotting the measurements from channels with large channel distances, we find
that a large fraction of consecutive measurements exhibit abrupt transitions from one
quantization level to another, resulting in asymmetry. The distillation stage seeks to
iteratively eliminate such measurements causing abrupt transitions. If the mismatch
is still too high even after one round of eliminations, it is necessary to eliminate
further; in which case, the next best elimination candidates are those that follow the
previously eliminated measurements. When this process is iterated over a number of
times, it is likely to improve the bit mismatch rate. Note that the number of iterations
required depends on the current expected mismatch rate of the channel, which can
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be determined based on the history of mismatch rate of the channel. Algorithm 4
succinctly expresses the steps taken in each iteration. Essentially, in a given block
of at least i quantization labels, which are identical (e.g., consecutive a’s), iteration
number i removes the prefix of length i from that block; in case the block length is
less than i, it removes the entire block.
Algorithm 4 assumes that the quantizer outputs the labels (e.g., a, b, c, d) of
each quantization interval instead of the actual bit pattern assigned to each interval.
exclude label is a special label indicating an eliminated measurement. In each itera-
tion, the distiller processes the input as shown in Algorithm 4. For the first iteration,
the distiller gets its input from the quantizer, and for the successive iterations, the
distiller’s output becomes the input for the next iteration. In the last iteration, the
distiller outputs the bit patterns corresponding to each quantization interval. The
following example shows two iterations of distillation; the symbol represents the
exclude label.
Distiller Input: aaaaabbaaaabbbbbaaaa · · ·
Iteration 1 output: aaaa b aaa bbbb aaa · · ·
Iteration 2 output: aaa aa bbb aa · · ·
Figure 3.23 shows the improvement in bit mismatch rate with each iteration for
the 5 × 5 configuration. Without distillation, the average mismatch rate is about
23%, in which case information reconciliation leaks out all the bits. However, two
iterations of distillation reduces the mismatch rate to a sufficiently small value (< 5%)
for efficient information reconciliation. Thus, despite the simplicity of the distillation
approach, these results show that it can reduce the bit mismatch rate very effectively.
3.7.7.4 Gain in Secret Bit Rate
Figure 3.24 shows a plot of the secret bit rate as a function of number of nodes
at Alice/Bob. It can be clearly seen that the secret bit rate increases almost linearly
with the number of nodes when the sampling rate is the same for all the N × N
cases. We also measure the randomness of the extracted bit streams using NIST’s
approximate entropy test. We find that the entropy values for the extracted secret
bit streams from all the N × N configurations (1 ≤ N ≤ 5) are close to 1, the ideal
value.
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3.8 Performance of Hierarchical Collaboration
In our evaluation of hierarchical collaboration, we use 4 nodes each at Alice
and Bob, respectively, in the slow-walk configuration. Following our discussion in
Section 3.7.6, we limit the size of each subgroup to 2 nodes. We assign channels 11
(2.405 GHz) and 21 (2.455 GHz), respectively, for the different subgroups of Alice and
Bob. The two subgroups of Bob switch between these frequencies for every np = 100
packet transmissions. For collecting the measurements from all the group members,
in our evaluation, we have used two TeloB nodes that are connected to the laptop.
One of the nodes collects measurements from all the group members operating on
channel 11, while the other node collects measurements from all the group members
operating on channel 21. The peak performance comparison of simple and hierarchical
collaboration is shown in Table 3.10.
Since there are two collaborating groups operating in parallel, it results in sub-
stantially higher secret bits per second (an increase of about 160%) using hierarchical
collaboration in comparison to simple collaboration. The bit mismatch rate is sub-
stantially lower with the hierarchical approach, 5.5%, vs 9.5% for simple collaboration.
Although more measurements are recorded per probe packet in the simple approach
compared to the hierarchical approach, a large fraction of the quantized bits is lost
due to the information reconciliation stage to reconcile the differences in the bit
sequences with such high bit mismatch rates. Consequently, the hierarchical approach
outperforms the simple collaborative approach in terms of secret bits per probe and
secret bits per mJ of transmission energy as well, with increases of about 33% and
35%, respectively.
The per-bit entropy of the output secret bits for both the approaches have com-
parable values that is close to the ideal value of one. However, the hierarchical
approach produces measurements with higher differential entropy in comparison to
the simple collaboration approach, because the hierarchical approach exploits both
space diversity and frequency diversity, and therefore, the collected measurements
are also affected by frequency selective fading. Thus, we can clearly see that a
combination of space and frequency diversity with frequency switching offers a very
good performance.
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3.9 Summary of Collaborative Secret Key Extraction
We summarize the results of our collaborative key extraction approach as follows.
1. Collaboration enables the extraction of stronger secret keys from more random
information sources because it significantly improves the differential entropy of
the collected measurements that is quadratic in the number of nodes.
2. Collaboration among sensor nodes allows for faster key extraction and in an
energy efficient manner.
3. Simple collaboration, exploiting space diversity, improves performance only with
a small number of nodes due to the fundamental trade-off between the quadratic
increase in the number of channel measurements due to multiple nodes per group
versus a linear reduction in sampling rate and a linear increase in the time gap -
both contributing to high bit mismatch rates, and which ultimately reduce the
rate of secret key extraction.
4. Hierarchical collaboration - (i) overcomes the high mismatch rate problem by
limiting collaboration among smaller subsets of nodes, (ii) achieves faster key
extraction by exploiting frequency diversity in addition to space diversity, and
(iii) further improves the differential entropy of collected measurements through
frequency switching.
We do not claim that our secret key extraction will work under all possible
real-world scenarios4. Nor do we claim that the scenarios we use in our experi-
ments represent all of the real-world scenarios. However, we do believe that our
technique advances the state-of-the-art of secret key extraction from wireless channel
characteristics and we show that it works well under our experimental set up. We
expect our scheme to also work under similar real-world scenarios, especially when
the spatio-temporal characteristics of the wireless channels cannot be predicted.
4In our earlier work [14] for a 1× 1 link, we demonstrated that secret key extraction works well
only under nonstatic scenarios.
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3.10 Related Work
While there is an extensive amount of research on using radio channel properties
for secret key extraction (e.g., [14, 20, 38, 41]), very few existing works have developed
these ideas in the context of sensor networks. Aono et al. [22] used a steerable
directional antenna in combination with Zigbee radio hardware to generate a secret
between two nodes and to test what an eavesdropper would have received. More
recently, [45] introduced high rate uncorrelated bit extraction (HRUBE), a framework
for interpolating, transforming for de-correlation, and encoding channel measurements
using a multibit adaptive quantization scheme. Patwari et al. analyzed the probability
of bit disagreement using a Gaussian assumption, and presented experimental results
for bit extraction using TelosB sensors. Our research significantly enhances these
existing works on secret key extraction in sensor networks by using collaboration
among sensors to obtain high entropy bits at a much higher bit rate.
The use of multiple antennas is not a new idea. [44] presented a theoretical study
on the use of MIMO radio channels for enhancing secret key extraction. Even though
we achieve multiple antenna capability through the use of collaborating sensor nodes,
our system differs from a typical MIMO transceiver because in our setup, the signals
transmitted from different nodes are not synchronized - nodes need to take turns
in transmitting their packets. Therefore, we cannot directly apply the methods of
Wallace et al. for our setup. Instead, a multiple node setup introduces new challenges
in terms of higher bit mismatch, which we address using interpolation, information
reconciliation, etc.
Our work differs from the work of Wallace et al. in the following significant ways.
First, we obtain the multi-antenna capability using multiple sensor nodes instead of
MIMO. Second, unlike a MIMO-based scheme, our research does not assume any
phase synchronization of RF signals. Third, we use real-world measurements from
TelosB sensors placed in the slow-walk or iRobot configurations for our evaluations.
Fourth, we extract secret bits using a 4-stage key extraction process that combines
the interpolation stage from [45] with the other stages from our earlier work [14].
Last, we also address the energy efficiency in our research.
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3.11 Conclusion
We proposed and experimentally evaluated a collaborative secret key extraction
scheme for wireless sensor networks. Our experimental results showed that there is
a significant increase in secret bit rate per second and per probe as well as per mJ
of transmission energy, due to collaboration. We also evaluated the fundamental
performance trade-off due to the increased number of measurements versus the in-
creased bit mismatch rate. While it may appear that collaboration requires many
nodes, leveraging measurements from many different sensors enables extraction of
stronger secret keys at a faster rate and in an energy efficient manner. While
the hierarchical approach uses more bandwidth (i.e., more than one channel), it
correspondingly reduces the duration over which the channels are occupied. We
have presented these results in three papers [55, 43, 56]. In the future, we will
evaluate our collaborative secret key extraction scheme with more experiments in
different kinds of environments. In this chapter and the previous chapter, we have
seen how wireless nodes can exploit the physical layer measurements representing the
wireless channel characteristics for establishing a secure communication channel at
upper layers between these nodes. In the next chapter, we show how the choice of
physical layer pulse shape can impact the efficiency of data transmission for best-effort
data traffic.
Figure 3.1. Simple collaboration exploits variations across N2 (here, N = 3)
channels. Sensors Sai, and Sbi belong to access points A and B, respectively.
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Algorithm 1 Simple Collaboration Method
procedure SCM(A,B, Sa, Sb, N)
. A,B - access points; Sa, Sb - sets of sensors in groups A,B; N - number of nodes
in each group
repeat
for i← 1, N do . group A’s transmissions
node Sai transmits a probe packet
for j ← 1, N do
node Sbj records an RSS measurement
end for
end for
for i← 1, N do . group B’s transmissions
node Sbi transmits a probe packet
for j ← 1, N do
node Saj records an RSS measurement
end for
end for
until enough measurements to establish key
for i← 1, N do
node Sai shares measurements / quantized bits
with A over secure channel sca
node Sbi shares measurements / quantized bits




Algorithm 2 Hierarchical Collaboration Method
procedure HCM(A,B, Sa, Sb, N,Ns)
. A,B - access points; Sa, Sb - set of sensors in groups A,B; N - number of nodes
in each group; Ns - number of nodes in each subgroup
num sub groups← N
Ns
for i← 1, num sub groups do
assign frequency ci to nodes ∈ subgroup Sai
assign frequency ci to nodes ∈ subgroup Sbi
end for
for i← 1, num sub groups do
run SCM(A,B, Sai, Sbi, Ns) . parallel execution
end for
end procedure
Figure 3.2. Hierarchical collaboration. Subgroups Sa1, Sa2 assigned to frequencies 1
and 2, respectively. Subgroups Sb1, Sb2 switch between frequencies 1 and 2 periodically
to produce N2 channels (in this figure, N = 4).
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Algorithm 3 Frequency Switch Algorithm
procedure Frequency Switch Procedure(ci, nc, np)
. ci - channel initially assigned
to calling node; nc - number of available channels; switch frequency after every np
transmissions; available channels = [0, 1, ...(nc − 1)]
curr channel← ci
loop
for i← 1, np do
transmit probe packet on curr channel
end for
curr channel← (curr channel + 1) mod nc
end loop
end procedure
Figure 3.3. Timing diagram for 3 × 3 setup. {0, 1, 2} ∈ Alice; {3, 4, 5} ∈ Bob.










Measurements on channel “0, 5” delayed by (1 + µ05)TR = 8.5∆. Measurements
on channel “5, 0” delayed by (1− µ05)TR = 3.5∆.
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Table 3.1. Total number of probe packets exchanged between the nodes of Alice and
Bob
Configuration Slow-walk experiment iRobot rotation experiment
1× 1 34446 30486
2× 2 43251 30977
3× 3 57885 28739
4× 4 68781 30406
5× 5 63332 32064
Table 3.2. Fraction of probe packets utilized in the key extraction process
Configuration Slow-walk experiment iRobot rotation experiment
1× 1 0.9987 0.9677
2× 2 0.9960 0.9920
3× 3 0.9554 0.9938
4× 4 0.9935 0.9906
5× 5 0.9888 0.9830
Table 3.3. Average sampling period, T for different setups
N ×N T second (slow-walk) T second (rotation)
1× 1 0.0202 0.0214
2× 2 0.0415 0.0415
3× 3 0.0672 0.0641
4× 4 0.0878 0.0879
5× 5 0.1139 0.1142
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Figure 3.4. Experimental setup. {A1, B1} ∈ slow-walk experiments. {A2, B2} ∈
rotation experiments. BS - base station. A1, A2 - stationary. B1 - moves along the
trajectory indicated by the arrows. B2 - rotates in place.
Figure 3.5. Secret key extraction process. a - RSS measurements, b - interpolated
measurements, c - quantized bits, d - reconciled bits, e - secret bits.
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Figure 3.6. Power spectral density of the shadow fading signal for the 3 × 3 and
4× 4 cases and the magnitude-square of the transfer function of the running average
filter for M = 24 and M = 18.
Table 3.4. Running average filter parameter M that reduces the effects of shadow
fading
N ×N M (slow-walk) M (rotation)
1× 1 50 50
2× 2 39 50
3× 3 24 50
4× 4 18 48



























Figure 3.7. Correlation coefficient matrix, C for the 3× 3 case in rotation configu-
ration, where element CXY of the matrix C equals ρMXMY . All CXY ,∀(X 6= Y ) are
almost close to zero.
Figure 3.8. p and q denote the distances between the closest and the farthest sensors,
respectively, in a circular configuration of 5 sensors. r is the radius of the circle, which
is approximately equal to 15cm.
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Table 3.5. Average correlation coefficient between measurements on different chan-
nels
N ×N ρMXMY (slow-walk) ρMXMY (rotation)
2× 2 0.1876 0.0031
3× 3 0.1841 0.0119
4× 4 0.2291 0.0155
5× 5 0.1900 0.0039
Figure 3.9. Channels between one node of Alice and 5 nodes of Bob.
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Figure 3.10. Approx. differential entropy vs N for rotation experiments.
Table 3.6. Percentage of bits that match between the secret bit sequences of different
channel pairs
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
c1 100.00% 47.92% 49.22% 51.69% 48.96%
c2 47.92% 100.00% 50.00% 50.65% 47.40%
c3 49.22% 50.00% 100.00% 49.87% 53.39%
c4 51.69% 50.65% 49.87% 100.00% 51.43%
c5 48.96% 47.40% 53.39% 51.43% 100.00%
Table 3.7. Mutual information between secret bits that are extracted from different
channels
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
c1 1.00 1.20× 10−3 1.84× 10−4 8.31× 10−4 3.20× 10−4
c2 1.20× 10−3 0.9994 1.16× 10−6 1.17× 10−4 1.90× 10−3
c3 1.84× 10−4 1.16× 10−6 0.9986 3.32× 10−6 3.20× 10−3
c4 8.31× 10−4 1.17× 10−4 3.32× 10−6 0.9999 6.05× 10−4
c5 3.20× 10−4 1.90× 10−3 3.20× 10−3 6.05× 10−4 0.9994
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Table 3.8. NIST - approximate entropy test results
Configuration Entropy (slow-walk) Entropy (rotation)
1× 1 0.9837 0.9882
2× 2 0.9836 0.9819
3× 3 0.9787 0.9858
4× 4 0.9879 0.9791
5× 5 0.9823 0.9832
Table 3.9. NIST statistical test suite results. The P-value from each test is listed
below. To pass a test, the P-value for that test must be greater than 0.01.
NIST test P-value (slow-walk) P-value (rotation)
Frequency 0.258744 0.217602
Block frequency 0.359077 0.350225
Cumulative sums (Fwd) 0.327781 0.127687
Cumulative sums (Rev) 0.378058 0.401227
Runs 0.317043 0.417624
Longest run of ones 0.157396 0.695291
FFT 0.915226 0.555973
Approximate entropy 0.269068 0.84317
Serial 0.040004, 0.051236 0.494123, 0.134310
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quantization intervals: µ ± (α × σ)
Figure 3.11. Mismatch rate as a function of α and N for slow-walk experiments.























quantization intervals: µ ± (α × σ)
































































Figure 3.14. Secret bits/probe as a function of mismatch rate and N (rotation)
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Figure 3.15. Power consumption of a TelosB sensor in the process of transmitting
a probe packet.

























Figure 3.16. Power consumption of a TelosB sensor in copying data from memory
to the FIFO buffer on the radio.
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Figure 3.18. Secret bits/mJ of Tx energy vs mismatch rate and N (rotation)
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Number of nodes in each group
slow−walk
rotation
Figure 3.19. Peak secret bits/mJ of Tx energy vs N with 2 byte probe pkts
























































Figure 3.20. Peak secret bit rate as a function of number of nodes in each group.
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Figure 3.21. Secret Bit Extraction Process. a - RSS measurements, b - quantization
interval labels, c - distilled bits, d - reconciled bits, e - secret bits.

















Figure 3.22. Bit mismatch rate vs channel distance
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Algorithm 4 Distill Input
while there is input do




previous label← current label
end if
end while


















Figure 3.23. Effectiveness of distillation in drastically reducing the bit mismatch
rate
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Number of nodes in each set
Figure 3.24. Secret bit rate vs number of nodes
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Table 3.10. Comparison of hierarchical and simple collaboration (N = 4)
Measure Hierarchical Simple
Secret bits per second 47.70 18.37
Secret bits per probe 0.5354 0.4033
Secret bits per mJ 2.283 1.685
of Tx energy
Bit mismatch rate 5.475% 9.477%
Approx. differential entropy 77.10 71.45
of RSS measurements
Entropy of output 0.9785 0.9879
secret bits
CHAPTER 4





Dynamic spectrum access networks, where multiple nodes compete to utilize a
shared frequency spectrum, have been gaining widespread attention in the recent
years. However, there are significant challenges in actually building such networks,
including limiting the amount of mutual interference among the transmissions from
different nodes.
Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM), which uses an orthogonal
set of subcarriers, has been proposed for the purpose of sharing the different sub-
sets of these subcarriers among nodes [7, 8] interested in dynamic spectrum access.
However, OFDM imposes tight timing and frequency synchronization requirements
among different nodes, which are very likely to be difficult to achieve in practice,
especially when the nodes belong to different administrative entities. Any lack of
synchronization can result in significant mutual interference among the signals of
different transmitters. A somewhat lesser known and understood multicarrier com-
munication system, filterbank multicarrier (FBMC), first proposed by Saltzberg [10],
can overcome the above limitations of OFDM through the use of special transmitter
and receiver pulse shaping filters, namely, the square root Nyquist filters. Through
the use of these filters, FBMC, in comparison to OFDM, promises a more efficient
spectrum utilization by minimizing interference across subcarriers [9]. Essentially,
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FBMC reduces the mutual interference between different transmitters to insignificant
levels.
While FBMC has been studied at the physical (PHY) layer [57], there is no existing
work on understanding its impact on reliable transmission of data packets/frames and
also on the data transmission rates. Furthermore, there is no cross layer research on
understanding the impact of FBMC beyond the PHY layer, e.g., at the MAC layer.
In order to fully understand and evaluate the promise of FBMC, in this chapter,
we first examine the use of special pulse shaping filters of the FBMC PHY layer in
reliably transmitting data packets at a very high rate. For this purpose, we analyze
the mutual interference power across subcarriers used by different transmitters. Next,
to understand the impact of FBMC beyond the PHY layer, we devise a distributed
and adaptive medium access control (MAC) protocol that coordinates data packet
traffic among the different nodes in the network in a best-effort manner. In our
protocol, when a node senses the current channel to be free, it seeks to increase or
reduce the size of the channel (i.e., number of subcarriers) depending on the packet
transmission success rate, and on how the current channel access delay compares with
the historic average delay. When the current channel is sensed to be busy, the node
actively attempts to transmit under smaller nonbusy channels, with fewer subcarriers,
to reduce the channel access delay. Our MAC protocol adds or drops subcarriers in
an additive increase and multiplicative decrease (AIMD) manner with the aim of
achieving fair use of subcarriers across multiple nodes.
We build a discrete event simulator to evaluate FBMC and compare its perfor-
mance with OFDM. We conduct extensive simulations of both FBMC and OFDM
systems that operate in static indoor environments with frequency selective fading
channels, and under different data traffic rates with varying number of nodes. Our
results show that FBMC consistently achieves at least an order of magnitude perfor-
mance improvement in several aspects including packet transmission delays, channel
access delays, and effective data transmission rate available to each node. These
improvements can be understood based on our findings that, in comparison to OFDM,
FBMC can (a) achieve substantially higher SINR, (b) reliably support modulation
schemes with very high data rates for a significant portion of time, and (c) achieve
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very low packet error rates.
We also examine the use of FBMC for dynamic spectrum access in a vehicular
network setup. Vehicular network communication is gaining importance in recent
times as it enables the sharing of emergency information, traffic/road conditions,
and weather-related data among different vehicles in real time, and also for delivering
advertisements on nearby gas stations, restaurants, etc. [58, 59]. We perform extensive
vehicular network simulations over larger, mobile, outdoor settings. For our vehicular
network simulations, we generate realistic vehicular mobility traces over the streets
of a typical city using VanetMobiSim [60] and the US Census Bureau TIGER GIS
database [61]. We find that FBMC achieves an order of magnitude performance
improvement over large distances in the vehicular networks scenario as well. Further,
in the case of multihop vehicular networks, FBMC can achieve about 20× smaller
end-to-end data packet delivery delays, and relatively low packet drop probabilities.
In summary, our research shows that a FBMC-based communication system offers
a much higher performing alternative to OFDM for networks that dynamically share
the spectrum among multiple nodes. We expect our research to have a profound
impact on the design of future dynamic spectrum access networks.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe
our problem setup. Section 4.3 describes the FBMC PHY layer. In Section 4.4,
we compare the PHY layer characteristics of OFDM and FBMC. In Section 4.5, we
describe our MAC layer, and discuss how we adapt TCP congestion control principles
and apply them to the problem of spectrum sharing. We present our results for the
static indoor environment in Section 4.6 and the results from our vehicular network
setup in Section 4.7. We discuss the related work in Section 4.8 and summarize our
findings in Section 4.9.
4.2 Problem Setup
We assume that there are multiple nodes, possibly belonging to different admin-
istrative entities, that compete to utilize the shared frequency spectrum. Nodes
belonging to different entities may be associated to different base stations, while
still sharing the same spectrum. The spectrum is divided into N subchannels or
101
subcarriers. In this work, we assume that nodes contend for free spaces in a 20
MHz channel, which is divided into N = 64 subcarriers, out of which 53 subcarriers
at the center of the channel are used, while the rest of the subcarriers on either
end form guard bands, as it is done typically with 802.11a channels. Unlike the
802.11 OFDM model, our dynamic spectrum access system model allows different
nodes to interleave their packet transmissions and achieve fair sharing of resources
across their heterogeneous traffic demands. Furthermore, within an 802.11 channel,
the channel gains for each specific node could be significantly different over different
subcarriers due to frequency selective fading. Thus, when each node contends only
for a portion of the spectrum that is favorable to that node, it may lead to a more
efficient spectral usage (e.g., FARA [62], distributed OFDMA [63]). However, we
note that in the case of an 802.11-like model, OFDM may be preferable due to its
lower computational complexity. We assume that a node can simultaneously receive
packets from multiple senders when the sets of subcarriers used by those senders are
all disjoint. We also assume that each node has multiple radios, in order to allow for
full duplex communication (as in standards like 3GPP LTE [64]) and to accurately
sense the spectrum for free space. Note that when only one radio is used, a node
will incur a short delay of about 5 µs to switch from receive/sense mode to transmit
mode before it can transmit a packet [65]. During this short intervening delay, if
another node starts to transmit a packet on an overlapping set of subcarriers, it will
cause collisions. Use of multiple radios allows nodes to avoid such mode switching
delays, and minimizes collisions due to inaccurate channel sensing. Finally, we would
like to note that while dynamic spectrum access can induce interference between the
transmissions of different nodes at a receiver, interference can also be caused by other
sources, for example, microwaves, which have not been considered in our model. In
other words, our work is mainly focused on assessing the effect of mutual interference
in a dynamic spectrum access scenario, independent of other factors.
4.3 Background on Filterbank Multicarrier
Communication
Multicarrier communication systems like FBMC and OFDM simultaneously trans-
mit signals across several subcarriers. In each subcarrier, the information bits are
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encoded and transmitted as a series of pulses of different amplitudes and phases.
To separate the signals on different subcarriers from one another, a pair of transmit
and receive filters corresponding to each subcarrier is used. The pulse shape used
by the transmit filter characterizes the power spectral density (PSD) of the signals
transmitted on each subcarrier, where the PSD describes the distribution of relative
signal power at different points in the spectrum.
FBMC uses special transmitter and receiver filters that are based on the square
root Nyquist (SR Nyquist [9]) pulse shapes. These filters can be designed from the
transformation of a square root raised cosine pulse to minimize a cost function that
strikes a balance between stopband attenuation, the residual intersymbol interference,
robust sensitivity to timing jitter, and/or reduced peak-to-average power ratio. Note
that by design, SR Nyquist pulse avoids intersymbol interference. Figure 4.1 shows
the SR Nyquist pulse shape that is used in FBMC, and as a reference, the rectangular
pulse shape of OFDM.
In the frequency domain, both the rectangular and SR Nyquist pulse shapes
exhibit spectral components at each point in the spectrum. However, for rectangular
pulses, these spectral components have very large magnitudes even very far away
from the subcarrier in which the signals are actually transmitted. In contrast, with
SR Nyquist pulse, these components have negligible magnitudes beyond just two
subcarriers from the subcarrier in which signals are transmitted. In other words, an
OFDM signal that is transmitted on an arbitrary subcarrier leaks out a significant
amount of power over all the other subcarriers in the channel, whereas an FBMC
signal does not leak significant power into the other subcarriers in the channel.
OFDM’s very high leakage power results in significant mutual interference among the
signals of different transmitters, while the relatively very low leakage power in FBMC
causes little mutual interference. We provide a mathematical analysis of interference
power in Section 4.4.
4.3.1 Complexity
In multicarrier communication systems, signal processing at the physical layer typ-
ically involves operations such as discrete Fourier transform, circular convolution, etc.
These operations, in turn, involve the use of complex numbers and the computational
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complexity is expressed in terms of number of complex number multiplications [66]. In
general, the basic structure of an FBMC system is perceived to be more complex than
OFDM. OFDM offers lower complexity in comparison to FBMC, in the case of single
user communication 1, for example [67]. However, the use of polyphase structures lead
to efficient implementations of FBMC systems [68]. For typical choices of systems
parameters, FBMC is 20% to 40% more complex than OFDM [57]. Moreover, when
OFDM is applied to multiple access applications, it either performs poorly, as we
demonstrate in this paper, or one has to add significant complexity to the system to
achieve perfect synchronization among different nodes or to apply computationally
expensive multiple access interference (MAI) cancellation techniques to improve on its
performance [69]. Sourck et al. [66] observe that MAI cancellation-enabled multiple
access OFDM systems are generally over an order of magnitude more complex than
their FBMC counterparts. Moreover, despite their much higher complexity, such
OFDM systems are not able to perfectly remove MAI, while FBMC suppresses MAI
almost perfectly.
4.4 FBMC vs OFDM - PHY Layer Characteristics
In this section, we present and compare the PHY layer characteristics of FBMC
and OFDM. We compare them in two different aspects - (i) power spectral density
(Section 4.4.1), and (ii) interference power at a receiver due to mutual interference
across subcarriers used by different transmitters (Section 4.4.2). This comparison
provides a PHY layer basis for our ultimate goal of understanding the impact of
FBMC on reliable transmission of data packets and on the data transmission rates.
4.4.1 Power Spectral Density
OFDM uses rectangular pulse shapes (Figure 4.1). It is widely used in practice,
including in the 802.11 WiFi systems. Figure 4.2 shows the power spectral density of
an OFDM signal which is transmitted on subcarrier number 0. The first side lobes
are just 13 dB below the main peak, and the side lobes near either end of the channel
(subcarrier numbers ±26) are about 40 dB below the main peak.
1We only consider the scenario of multi-user communication in this work.
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In 802.11a and other standards, it has often been proposed to replace the rectan-
gular pulse of OFDM (see Figure 4.1) by a raised-cosine pulse. This modified OFDM
is called Filtered-OFDM (fOFDM) [7]. The fOFDM exhibits lower side lobes when
compared with OFDM. However, for the suggested roll-off factor in 802.11a (2.5%),
this improvement is not significant. Figure 4.2 compares the power spectral densities
(PSDs) of OFDM and fOFDM. The differences between the two PSDs are exhibited
only at far away frequencies - the side lobes near either end of the channel are about
45 dB below the main peak for fOFDM, an improvement of about 5 dB only over
OFDM.
The very large side lobes of OFDM/fOFDM can result in significant mutual
interference among signals of different subcarriers that are transmitted by different
nodes if those signals are not perfectly synchronized both in time and frequency.
This synchronization is difficult to achieve in practice, especially if the various nodes
belong to different entities.
Recall that FBMC uses SR Nyquist pulse shapes (Figure 4.1). Figure 4.3 shows
the power spectral density of an FBMC signal which is transmitted on subcarrier
number 0. In a stark/sharp contrast to the spectral components of an OFDM signal
(Figure 4.2), all the spectral components outside the main lobe of an FBMC signal are
at least 80 dB below the main peak (Figure 4.3). Comparison of the power spectral
densities of the OFDM and FBMC signals reveals that FBMC will more effectively
contain the signals of different transmitters in their respective subcarrier bands, and
thereby minimize the mutual interference among the signals of different transmitters.
4.4.2 Analysis of Interference Power
In this section, we derive an analytical expression for the interference power at a
receiver due to mutual interference across subcarriers used by different transmitters.
In this analysis, we assume that the wireless channel is a linear time invariant (LTI)
filter. Therefore, our analysis in this section applies to static channels, which can be
described as LTI filters.
Let Rn(f) denote the frequency response of the receiver filter corresponding to the
nth subcarrier, where −N
2
≤ n < N
2
and N is the number of subcarriers. For OFDM,
R0(f) is the Fourier transform of the rectangular function, i.e., the sinc function.
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For FBMC, R0(f) is obtained by taking the fast Fourier transform of the SR Nyquist
pulse shown in Figure 4.1. Rn(f) is obtained from R0(f) by appropriately shifting
the samples depending on the value of n.
Let Hx,y(f) denote the frequency response of the wireless channel between the
transmitter (x) and receiver (y). Then, the combined frequency response of the
wireless channel filter and the receiver filter,
Cx,y,n(f) = Hx,y(f)×Rn(f). (4.1)
Cx,y,n(f) is LTI as both Rn(f) and Hx,y(f) are LTI filters.
Let ϕx→∗,m→∗(f) denote the power spectral density of the signal that is transmitted
by node x on the mth subcarrier, and let ϕy←x,n←m(f) denote the power spectral
density of the signal that is received by node y on the nth receiver filter, when the
signal is transmitted by node x on the mth subcarrier. Since Cx,y,n(f) is LTI, it follows
that,
ϕy←x,n←m(f) = |Cx,y,n(f)|2 × ϕx→∗,m→∗(f). (4.2)
Let Iy←x(n,m) denote the interference power on filter n of receiver y, when the





Figure 4.4 shows a plot of Iy←x(0,m) as a function of m, i.e., interference power
on receiver filter 0 as a function of the subcarrier number on which the interferer
is transmitting for both fOFDM and FBMC. To better understand the differences
between the performance of FBMC and fOFDM, consider the following example cases.
In all the cases, let the desired sender transmit its signals on subcarrier number 0.
1. The interferer transmits its signals on subcarrier number 0. The channel losses
between the (sender, receiver) and (interferer, receiver) node pairs are equal.
Since the interference power equals the signal power (0 dB), the signal-to-
interference ratio, SIR = 0 dB for both fOFDM and FBMC.
2. The interferer transmits on subcarrier number−5 (or +5), and as in the previous
case, the channel losses between the (sender, receiver) and (interferer, receiver)
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node pairs are equal. In this case, the interference power is about 24 dB below
the signal power (SIR = 24 dB) with fOFDM. However, with FBMC, the
interference power drops drastically - to about 110 dB below the signal power
(SIR = 110 dB).
3. The interferer transmits on subcarrier number −5 (or +5). However, assume
that the interferer is now closer to the receiver in such a way that the interference
power is 21 dB more than that in case 2. In this new scenario, the SIR will be
around 3 dB for fOFDM, and around 89 dB for FBMC.
4. The interferer uses two subcarriers −5 and +5, and is also closer to the receiver
as in the previous case. In this case, the SIR ends up with around 0 dB for
fOFDM, while FBMC still has a very high SIR of about 86 dB.
These example cases clearly show that FBMC will be very effective in reducing
interference when multiple nodes share the spectrum.
4.4.2.1 SINR on a Subcarrier
Let Sy←x(m) denote the desired signal power on receiver filter m, when x is the













where u belongs to the set of all undesired transmitters for receiver y, and for each
u, k belongs to the set of all subcarriers on which u transmits its signals.
Let SINRy←x(n) denote the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio on subcarrier






We use (4.6) for calculating the signal-to-interference and noise ratio in our simula-
tions. The plots shown in Figure 4.4 assume only one interferer which is transmitting
107
on a single subcarrier. When there are more interfering signals, the total inter-
ference power (I∗y (n)) will become larger and this may become very significant for
OFDM/fOFDM. In comparison, FBMC will be relatively unaffected by interference
from other nodes. Consequently, FBMC will achieve very high SINR values consis-
tently, as we show in our evaluation (Section 4.6). Moreover, FBMC achieves very
high SINR even though it uses the same amount of signal power as OFDM/fOFDM.
Such improvements at the PHY layer translate into phenomenal performance gains
at the MAC layer, as we show in Section 4.6. Considering that OFDM is very widely
used currently and is also proposed for spectrum sharing, our research brings forth the
broader impact and the benefits that the next-generation dynamic spectrum access
networks will have if they use FBMC instead of OFDM.
4.5 AIMD MAC Protocol
In order to understand the impact of FBMC beyond the PHY layer, we devise a
medium access control (MAC) protocol that achieves the following goals. Each node in
the network - (i) avails a fair share of the available spectrum, (ii) adapts its own traffic
according to the overall traffic in the network, (iii) makes decisions independently
without any coordination from a centralized node on the use of different subcarriers.
Our MAC protocol is designed/intended for conventional applications that exchange
best-effort traffic, where the nodes contend for the subcarriers and backoff if necessary.
AIMD TCP congestion control [70, 71] promises a fair share of the link bandwidth
to the different TCP connections sharing a common intermediate link. While the
TCP-AIMD and our MAC protocol share similar design goals, the differences lie in
(i) the type of resource that is being shared, and (ii) how each node adapts the amount
of resource that it uses. In TCP, link bandwidth is the shared resource, whereas in
our system, the shared resource is a set of subcarriers available in the spectrum.
While the TCP sources adapt their sending rate depending on the level of congestion
in the network, the nodes in our system model adapt their channel size (number of
subcarriers) using a combination of two different measures, namely, channel access
delay and packet error rate, which together better reflect the overall traffic/contention
in the network and the error performance of the channel.
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We explain the principles behind our AIMD-MAC protocol as follows.
4.5.1 Channel Selection
Prior to its first transmission, a node senses the spectrum to identify the set of
subcarriers that are not used for transmissions by other nodes. Then, from this set,
it considers the largest block of contiguous subcarriers since it promises for a greater
expansion in the future; then, it selects a certain number (α) of subcarriers at the
center of this block for its current transmission.
4.5.2 Identifying a Promising Channel
We consider a channel to be promising, when the following conditions are met – (a)
the node perceives a low degree of contention / congestion and (b) packet error rate is
below a configurable threshold. Otherwise, the channel is considered as unpromising.
4.5.3 Adapting the Channel Size
When a node determines that a channel (set of subcarriers) is promising, it
attempts to expand it by additively increasing the number of subcarriers by a total of
α subcarriers, where α/2 subcarriers are added to either side of the current channel
(note that α is a constant number). When a channel is unpromising, the node
multiplicatively decreases the number of subcarriers, retaining only a β fraction of
subcarriers at the center of its current channel.
If a channel is promising, but expansion is not possible due to the transmissions
of other nodes in nearby subcarriers, the node will use the existing channel. Second,
if a channel is unpromising, but multiplicative decrease is not possible because the
number of subcarriers equals the minimum value, our MAC protocol chooses to either
use the existing channel or look for opportunities elsewhere in the spectrum with equal
probability.
4.5.4 Detecting and Handling Link-layer Congestion
We use the channel access delay for measuring the level of link layer contention.
Channel access delay represents the amount of time that a node has waited to acquire
the channel and transmit a given packet. A large channel access delay indicates
heavy contention for the wireless channel and vice-versa. Therefore, channel access
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delay is a direct measure of link-layer congestion in a wireless network. If there is
heavy contention, then it is desirable to reduce the channel size as it will improve
the probability of finding an unoccupied channel. Essentially, when multiple nodes
compete for a certain number of subcarriers, the likelihood of finding a large number
of subcarriers to be unoccupied at the same time is comparatively less than the
likelihood of finding a smaller number of subcarriers to be unoccupied.
In our evaluation, each node maintains a running average of the channel access
delay per packet which is calculated over the set of packets it has transmitted in
the past. This running average characterizes the history. Then, a node perceives
heavy contention for the channel when its current channel access delay is greater
than the historic average delay and vice-versa. When heavy contention is perceived
(i.e., channel is unpromising), it multiplicatively reduces the channel size.
4.5.5 Dealing with High Packet Error Rate
When a number of nodes share the spectrum and transmit their information bits
on subcarriers that are closely located in the frequency space, bit errors can occur
due to strong mutual interference between their signals. If the transmitters that are
involved in causing interference to one another’s signals mutually reduce the number
of subcarriers in such a way that their subcarriers become less close in the frequency
space than they currently are (i.e., their respective subcarrier bands become separated
further apart), it will help in reducing interference and thereby reduce packet errors.
To make it concrete, a node multiplicatively reduces its channel size when the
packet error rate on the current channel is above a configurable threshold (e.g., 20%).
We assume that the receiver feedbacks the transmitter with either the actual packet
error rates, or raw SINR values which the transmitter can use to obtain an estimate
of the packet error rate; the latter case is similar to the SINR feedbacks in FARA
[62].
4.5.6 Backoff for Existing Channel versus Transmit
Using a Smaller Channel
Suppose that the current channel is busy, but that there exists a smaller channel
that is not busy, and whose set of subcarriers is a proper subset of the set of subcarriers
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in the current channel. Consider the following cases. Case 1: The sender’s waiting
time has become inordinately large such that it is greater than the transmission delay
of the packet, where waiting time equals the current channel access delay + possible
random backoff delay, in the immediate future if the packet will not be transmitted
at this instant. Case 2: A node has waited for a very long time to transmit a packet
because the channel has been found to be busy for a number of attempts, with the
channel access delay greater than its historic average. In either case, it is more
desirable to transmit immediately using the smaller nonbusy channel, rather than
backoff the transmission. In all other cases, it is not unreasonable to backoff, i.e.,
wait further for the current channel to become free.
4.5.7 Contiguous versus Noncontiguous Access
A transmitter node is required to leave a few guard subcarriers on either side of
each block of subcarriers it intends to use for transmissions in order to avoid significant
interference from the transmissions of other nodes in the nearby subcarriers. In
our simulations, we use two guard subcarriers inbetween any two adjacent blocks of
subcarriers that are used by different transmitter nodes. Guard subcarriers represent
an overhead - wasted spectrum space that could have otherwise been utilized for useful
transmissions. If a node chooses to simultaneously use several noncontiguous blocks
of subcarriers, then it increases the ratio of the number of guard subcarriers to the
number of subcarriers used for transmission; i.e., it reduces the spectrum efficiency.
Therefore, in this work, we allow each node to access only one contiguous set of
subcarriers for its transmissions. Contiguous access is also favored in a number of
existing works (e.g., [72]).
4.5.8 Isolating the Transmissions of Different Nodes
The transmitter can signal the receiver node about its selection of subcarriers
through a dedicated, common control channel, which could be a small subset of the
N available subcarriers. However, the use of a dedicated control channel may become
a significant overhead when the network traffic grows.
Alternatively, a receiver can infer any new packet transmission on its own, without
depending on a control channel, as follows. Since any new transmission produces
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a distinguishable spike in the power levels over a contiguous group of subcarriers,
a receiver can readily identify the starting and ending subcarrier indices that a
transmitter uses by observing the first order derivative of the power spectral density
measurements [63]. Using these indices, the receiver can isolate the transmissions of
different nodes, demodulate the signals, and decode the packets. Then, using the
link layer header information (e.g., destination address) in the decoded packet, the
receiver can choose to pass a packet to an upper layer depending on whether the
packet is intended for the receiver.
4.5.9 How Should AIMD-MAC Behave when there
Is a Large Number of Subcarriers?
In our simulations, we consider a channel that is divided into 64 subcarriers, which
is a relatively small number. However, in some systems, the number of subcarriers
could be very large (e.g., up to 2048 subcarriers in a WiMax channel). In such cases,
it will be inefficient to additively increment the number of subcarriers by a small α
value at each instant. Therefore, it is more appropriate to either have correspondingly
larger α values, or increase the number of subcarriers exponentially until a threshold
is reached when using smaller α values, akin to the Slow-Start component of the TCP
congestion control mechanism.
4.6 Performance in Static, Indoor Settings
In this section, we first describe our simulation environment and the various
models that we use in building our discrete event simulator (Section 4.6.1). We
evaluate the performance of FBMC and OFDM in indoor, static environments and
present our extensive simulation results from Section 4.6.2 to Section 4.6.6.
4.6.1 Components of Our Indoor Network Simulator
While there are a large number of OFDM systems available commercially, cur-
rently, there exists no practical system implementation with the FBMC PHY layer.
Therefore, in order to compare the performance of FBMC and OFDM, we build a dis-
crete event simulator that enables the execution of various tasks – packet transmission,
random MAC backoff, idle wait, etc. – among the various nodes in a chronological
order.
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When there are a large number of nodes, computing the interference power over
several subcarriers and at different points in time over each packet, using Equation 4.3
is extremely time consuming. Hence, to run our simulations more efficiently, whenever
we compute interference power using Equation 4.3, we cache it in a table for possible
reuse later.
4.6.1.1 Simulation Environment
We use a total of Nt nodes in our simulations, where Nt ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40, 50} and
there are Nt/10 base stations, Nt/10 mutually disjoint sets of clients (i.e., 9 clients
in each set), where each such set of clients is associated to a different base station.
For each PHY layer and for each Nt, the nodes exchange a total of 100, 000 packets.
All the Nt nodes are placed in a square shaped area with a diagonal of 100 feet. The
position of each node is uniformly distributed inside the square region. Various nodes
contend for the 53 subcarriers over a 20 MHz channel in the range 5000 MHz - 5020
MHz.
4.6.1.2 Channel Model
We model the multipath, frequency selective fading wireless channel for an indoor
static environment following Hashemi et al. [73]. We determine path loss for our
environment using the Keenan-Motley partition loss model [74, 75, 76]. The noise
power is calculated as, Npower = NF × k × T × B, where NF is the noise figure, k
is the Boltzmann’s constant, T is the ambient temperature (= 290K), and B is the
bandwidth (= 20 MHz). As defined in the IEEE 802.11a standard, we choose noise
figure, NF = 10 dB and transmit power of 200 mW [74].
4.6.1.3 Packet Error Rate Model
Awoniyi et al. [74] express packet error rate as a function of the channel gain,
SNR, data rate, and packet size. In their model, they assume a single user case,
where the entire channel is occupied by one user at a time. We generalize Awoniyi’s
method to apply it to the scenario where many nodes simultaneously occupy different
subsets of subcarriers.
Notice that the interference power on each subcarrier at a receiver could vary
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with time, within the course of a single packet transmission, since other nodes may
arbitrarily start (or finish) new (or existing) packet transmissions at any instant. Fur-
ther, the received signal power could also vary with each subcarrier due to frequency
selective fading. Thus, the SINR, and hence bit error probability (b.e.p.), could vary
with both time and frequency. We appropriately average these probabilities to obtain
a more accurate estimate of the overall b.e.p. over the entire packet, using which we
compute the packet error rate as outlined in Awoniyi et al. [74].
4.6.1.4 Rate Adaptation
In our model, similar to existing schemes (e.g., [62]), we assume that for each
received packet, the receiver feedbacks the transmitter with an SINR value, which
represents an average across all the subcarriers used for transmission over its life time.
Using this feedback, the transmitter selects the appropriate modulation scheme to use
for the subsequent packet transmission.
4.6.1.5 Packet Traffic Modeling
We model packet traffic using the observations of Yeo et al. [77]. In our model,
packet lengths follow an exponential distribution with mean/minimum/maximum
sizes being 100/64/1500 bytes, respectively. The mean packet interarrival duration is
10 ms for clients and (10/Nc) ms for base stations, where the number of clients per
base station, Nc = 9 in our simulations.
4.6.2 Comparison of SINR and Modulation Scheme Selection
Figure 4.5 shows a sample variation in the SINR over 100 consecutive packets with
Nt = 30 nodes. The median SINR lies in the range of 11 − 12 dB for both OFDM
and fOFDM. In a sharp contrast, the median SINR for FBMC is around 30 dB, i.e.,
FBMC consistently achieves substantially higher SINR in comparison to both OFDM
and fOFDM.
With very high SINR, FBMC can reliably support modulation schemes with very
high data rates. Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of each modulation scheme. About
87% of the time, FBMC is able to support 256-QAM, whereas OFDM/fOFDM can
support it only for about 14% − 15% of the time. Further, OFDM/fOFDM selects
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BPSK, which has the lowest data rate, for about 40% of the time. Moreover, the
usage distribution of the different modulation schemes generally fall with increase in
the data rate supported by the modulation scheme for OFDM/fOFDM, and which is
completely opposite to the distribution of modulation schemes for FBMC. Note that
a single 256-QAM symbol encodes 8 bits of information, whereas a BPSK symbol
encodes only 1 bit of information. Therefore, using FBMC should allow a node to
transmit bits at a much faster rate in comparison to both OFDM and fOFDM.
4.6.3 Comparison of Packet Error Rate
Figure 4.7 shows a comparison of packet error rates with varying number of nodes.
FBMC has negligible packet error rates (≤ 0.113%) regardless of the number of nodes
sharing the spectrum. The performance of OFDM/fOFDM compares with FBMC
only in the case of 10 nodes, as in this case, the amount of traffic is relatively low
and as a consequence, the effect of mutual interference among different nodes is
minimum even with OFDM. In all the other cases with more nodes, the packet error
rate performance of OFDM/fOFDM is dramatically different from that of FBMC,
where about 30% packets are in error. This clearly shows the effectiveness of FBMC
receivers at filtering out transmissions of undesired senders on all subcarriers in which
a receiver is not interested.
4.6.4 Comparison of Transmission and Channel Access Delays
Transmission delay (td) depends on the packet size (b), number of subcarriers
(s) used for transmission, number of bits encoded in each symbol (log2(M)), which
depends on the modulation scheme, and the coding rate. For all modulation schemes,
we select a coding rate of (1/2) using convolutional coding. In 802.11a/g, when 48
subcarriers are used for data transmission, a data rate of 6 Mbps is achieved when
using BPSK and a coding rate of (1/2). Using this fact, the transmission delay (td)









Figure 4.8 shows a plot of average transmission delay per packet as a function of
number of nodes in the network. With 20 or more nodes, FBMC achieves an order of
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magnitude reduction in the average transmission delay per packet over both OFDM
and fOFDM. Figure 4.9 shows a plot of average channel access delay per packet as
a function of number of nodes. Again, with 20 or more nodes, FBMC achieves more
than an order of magnitude reduction in the average channel access delay per packet.
As an example, with 50 nodes, using OFDM/fOFDM requires a node to wait, on
average, more than 10 ms in order to acquire the channel and transmit a packet. In a
sharp contrast, under the same setting, FBMC requires a node to wait, on an average,
less than 1 ms. Therefore, FBMC will enable upper layer applications, particularly
real-time applications, to exchange data with very short delays.
4.6.5 Effective Data Rate Available per Node
To understand the differences in the rate at which a node can transmit data bits





p(channel access+ tx delay)
(4.8)
where p belongs to the set of all packets, and ps belongs to the set of all packets
that are received successfully (no packet error). Therefore, the effective data rate
measure also accounts for the wasted bandwidth due to those packets received in
error. Figure 4.10 shows a plot of effective data rate available per node versus the
number of nodes. FBMC consistently outperforms OFDM/fOFDM with more than
an order of magnitude difference, when there are 20 or more nodes, in the number of
bits transmitted successfully per second (which is similar to the measure, goodput).
4.6.6 Performance Variation with AIMD-MAC Parameter
In the results we have seen thus far, we have chosen the AIMD-MAC parameter,
α = 2, and β = (1/2); i.e., the number of subcarriers is additively incremented by two
(for promising channel), and is halved (for unpromising channel). Figure 4.11 shows
how the effective data transmission rate for FBMC varies with α, when β = 1/α for
the scenario with Nt = 30 nodes. While large α (i.e., smaller β) values additively
increment the channel size by a large value when it is promising, multiplicative
decrease due to unpromising channel causes it to shrink in size more aggressively.
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Further, smaller α values yield better performance because it increases the chance of
many nodes to share the spectrum.
4.7 Performance in Outdoor, Vehicular Network
Settings
In this section, we evaluate the performance of FBMC and fOFDM under outdoor,
block fading channels in a vehicular network setup. We describe the components
of our simulator and compare the performance of FBMC and fOFDM in a single-
hop vehicular network in Section 4.7.1 and Section 4.7.2, respectively. We analyze
the multi-hop vehicular network performance in Section 4.7.3. We summarize the
main results of our FBMC-based approach for dynamic spectrum access in vehicular
networks in Section 4.7.4.
4.7.1 Components of Our Single-Hop Vehicular Network Simulator
4.7.1.1 Outdoor Environment
We consider an area of A × A square meters, where A ∈ {100, 200}, whose
approximate central latitude and longitude in decimal degrees notation are 40.764670◦
and −111.870781◦, respectively. It corresponds to the intersection of 700 East and
200 South streets in Salt Lake City. We obtain the road maps for our simulation
from the US Census Bureau TIGER GIS database [61]. Each road-side access point
is located on one of the four corners of the road intersection, and when M = 50, we
place the fifth access point on the median of the 700 East street where it meets the
northern edge of the intersection.
4.7.1.2 Vehicular Mobility
VanetMobiSim [60] can generate mobility traces over the actual streets of any US
city, or a section of the city. Using the TIGER GIS maps as input to VanetMobiSim,
we generate realistic vehicular movement patterns, where vehicles - slow down and
stop at intersections, follow the posted speed limits, regulate their speed based on
other vehicles on the front, accelerate/decelerate obeying the laws of physics, etc.
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4.7.1.3 Channel Model
We model the multipath, frequency selective fading wireless channel for an outdoor
environment following Rappaport et al. [78]. We assume a block fading channel,
in which the wireless channel undergoes changes with each packet transmission.
Specifically, whenever any transmitter node, t, where (1 ≤ t ≤ M), starts a new
packet transmission, we generate new fading channels for all node pairs in the set
{(t, r) | r 6= t, 1 ≤ r ≤M}.
We determine path loss using the model of Cheng et al. [79], which is based on
real-world vehicular measurements. As defined in the IEEE 802.11p standard, we use
a max. transmit power of 760mW . Different nodes in the network contend for the
53 subcarriers over a 20 MHz channel in the 5.9 GHz frequency range.
For modeling packet error rate, rate adaptation, and packet traffic, we use the
models that we describe in Section 4.6.1.
4.7.2 Single-Hop Network Performance
We compare the performance of FBMC and fOFDM as a function of distance
using a number of metrics in Section 4.7.2.1. We examine the impact of blasting at
full transmit power versus the use of power control in Section 4.7.2.2. Finally, we
investigate the impact of the size of the simulation region in Section 4.7.2.3. We use
M = 40 nodes in our evaluation and these M nodes exchange a total of 500, 000
packets.
4.7.2.1 Performance Variation w.r.t. Distance
A large outdoor area that we use in our evaluation allows us to compare the
variation in performance of FBMC and fOFDM as a function of the distance between
the transmitter and receiver nodes. In this subsection, we assume that the simulation
region has an area of A2 = 1002m2.
4.7.2.1.1 Comparison of SINR. We make the following interesting obser-
vations in Figure 4.12: (i) the median SINR of fOFDM, even at the smallest distance
(≈ 19 dB), is still much less than the SINR of FBMC at the farthest distance (≈ 26
dB), (ii) the median SINR achieved at the farthest distance with FBMC is high
enough to reliably support 256-QAM, the highest data rate modulation scheme we
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use in this work, whereas fOFDM cannot support it even at the smallest distance,
and (iii) for any given distance, FBMC consistently achieves almost 19 dB greater
SINR than that of fOFDM. Therefore, FBMC can help in building very high speed
vehicular networks covering large distances.
4.7.2.1.2 Comparison of modulation schemes. With very high SINR,
FBMC can reliably support modulation schemes with very high data rates. Fig-
ure 4.13 shows the distribution of each modulation scheme. About 89% of the time,
FBMC is able to support 256-QAM, whereas fOFDM can support it only for about
5% of the time. In addition, fOFDM selects considerably lower data rate modulation
schemes for a significant portion of time. Note that a single 256-QAM symbol encodes
8 bits of information, whereas each symbol in BPSK, a lower data rate modulation
scheme, encodes only 1 bit of information. Therefore, using FBMC should allow a
node to transmit bits at a much faster rate in comparison to fOFDM.
4.7.2.1.3 Comparison of transmission delay. At larger distances, fOFDM
is forced to select lower data rate modulation schemes due to low SINR. Therefore,
the packet transmission delay increases significantly with distance for fOFDM, as we
see in Figure 4.14. On the other hand, since the median SINR for FBMC is high
enough to support 256-QAM at all distances, FBMC can achieve almost no increase
in the average transmission delay even at farther distances; this is also evidenced from
the fact that close to 90% of the time, FBMC supports 256-QAM (Figure 4.6).
4.7.2.1.4 Comparison of packet error rates. Figure 4.15 shows a compar-
ison of the packet error rates as a function of the distance. For a given modulation
scheme, the margin between the minimum required SINR and the achieved median
SINR decreases with increase in distance; therefore, signals from undesired transmit-
ters can more easily cause significant mutual interference as the distance between
the desired transmitter and receiver grows. This effect causes the increase in packet
errors with distance for both fOFDM and FBMC. However, at the shortest distance,
the packet error rate of FBMC is about 56× smaller than that of fOFDM. Further,
even though the packet error rate of FBMC appears to increase more significantly
with distance, although on a much smaller scale in comparison to fOFD-M, at the
farthest distance, the packet error rate of FBMC is still about 2.8× smaller than that
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of fOFDM. This shows that the packer error performance of FBMC is significantly
better than fOFDM for short range communication in outdoor settings.
4.7.2.1.5 Comparison of effective data rate. Our effective data rate mea-
sure captures the number of bits successfully transmitted per second; i.e., it considers
the overhead due to channel access delays and wastage in bandwidth due to packet
errors. As we see in Figure 4.16, the effective data transmission rate decreases slowly
with increase in distance for both FBMC and fOFDM. While we can clearly see the
differences in their performance across all distances, the performance gap increases
with distance - at the smallest distance, FBMC achieves ∼ 11.7× the performance of
fOFDM, while at the farthest distance, FBMC achieves ∼ 15.5× the performance of
fOFDM.
4.7.2.2 Blasting at Full Transmit Power versus Using
Power Control
In this work, we also consider the use of transmit power control at each node.
When using power control, nodes adjust their transmit power to compensate for the
path loss which increases with distance. In other words, for all pairs of communicating
transmitter and receiver nodes, all the receiver nodes receive an equal amount of signal
power from their corresponding desired transmitter. The power control is subject to
the maximum transmit power constraint of 760 mW, which is set by the FCC; i.e.,
nodes that are separated by the largest distance use a transmit power of 760 mW,
while those that are separated by smaller distances use correspondingly lower transmit
power.
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 show a comparison of blasting at full transmit power
vs the use of power control. For the data in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, we use a
simulation region whose area is A2 = 1002m2. While the desired signal power that
reaches an intended receiver node (r) is controlled, the mutual interference power
due to an unintended transmitter that reaches the node r is not controlled, which is
primarily determined by the proximity of the undesired / interfering transmitter to
its intended receiver as well as the node r. The performance of fOFDM is largely
determined by the effects of mutual interference whether the transmitter nodes blast
at full power or use power control, as we see in Table 4.1 that there is little difference
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in their performance. With FBMC on the other hand, when all nodes blast at full
transmit power, an FBMC receiver that is closer to its desired transmitter can achieve
greater SINR since it can effectively filter out the undesired mutual interference power.
Therefore, FBMC achieves better performance when blasting at full power and it
undergoes a slight degradation in performance with the use of power control. It may
thus appear that the use of power control presents a case that is more advantageous
for fOFDM. However, FBMC produces significant improvement in performance over
fOFDM irrespective of whether the nodes blast at full power (an order of magnitude
improvement) or use power control (about 8× improvement). Note that except for
the power control results that we show in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, all the other results
in this paper assume that nodes blast at full transmit power since it yields the best
performance.
4.7.2.3 Impact of the Size of the Simulation Region
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 compare the difference in performance due to an increase
in the size of the simulation area. For both fOFDM and FBMC, the increase in the
size of the simulation area does not very significantly reduce the performance. This
is due to the following reason.
The increase in the size of the simulation area from 100m×100m to 200m×200m
causes the farthest distance between an interferer and a receiver to double, i.e., from
100m to 200m. However, for both 100m × 100m and 200m × 200m cases, as the
access points are located on the intersection of two streets, which is near the center
of the simulation area, the farthest distance between a desired transmitter and a
receiver is increased from about 70m to 119m only, i.e., the distance between the
desired transmitter and receiver is not doubled. As a result, the interfering signals
experience greater path loss than the desired signal, on average. Therefore, despite
the increase in the size of the simulation area, there is not a significant decrease in
performance for both fOFDM and FBMC PHY layers.
4.7.3 Multihop Network Performance
We assume that the multihop network is realized with the help of moving cars
and/or road-side relays acting as hops on a multi-hop path. In this subsection, first
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we analyze the packet delivery performance for the real-time and broadcast packet
traffic that do not use ACKs in Section 4.7.3.1. Then, in Section 4.7.3.2 we compare
the end-to-end packet delivery delays when ACKs are used.
4.7.3.1 Comparison of Packet Delivery Probability
In this subsubsection, we consider the following types of traffic that do not specif-
ically depend on link layer ACKs: (i) unicast packet transmissions from delay-sens-
itive / real-time applications, (ii) broadcast packet transmissions, which are very
crucial to the operation of an ad hoc network; for example, reactive routing protocols
like AODV [80], LAR [81], etc. depend on route request packet broadcasts to establish
an end-to-end route between any pair of source and destination nodes.
Let pe denote the average packet error rate across a wireless link. Let pd denote
the probability that a packet gets dropped while crossing hop number, h. Then,
pd = 1− (1− pe)h.
Our expression for pd assumes independence of packet transmission errors across
each hop. We argue that this is a reasonable assumption for the following reasons:
(i) each receiver node has a different spatial relationship (i.e., varying distances)
with other transmitters in its vicinity; in other words, the sets of interferers, which
can cause strong mutual interference (and consequently bit errors), to each receiver
node in a multi-hop path are likely to be different from one another, (ii) further,
the same set of interfering nodes are not likely to be actively transmitting when the
packet in question is being transmitted across different hops, because upon receiving
a packet, a node has to first wait to acquire the channel before it can transmit it
across the successive hop, and (iii) finally, we also note that in a dynamic spectrum
access setup, transmissions across each hop can be carried out using different sets of
subcarriers, which also minimizes the hidden terminal problem. For example, in a
chain of multi-hop nodes, A → B → C → D, where the A and C are hidden from
one another, the potential collisions that can occur at node B due to simultaneous
transmissions A→ B, and B → C or C → D is minimized with the use of a different
set of subcarriers for these transmissions.
Figure 4.17 shows the packet drop probability as a function of the number of
hops. For the purpose of plotting this figure, we assume a simulation region whose
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area is 1002m2 and that these nodes blast at full transmit power. The packet drop
probability rapidly approaches the value of one for fOFDM in comparison to FBMC.
For example, even with just 5 hops, the packet drop probability is greater than 75%
for fOFDM, whereas it is less than 20% for FBMC. For fOFDM, when route request
packets are dropped with such high probabilities, it will be extremely difficult even to
establish a useful end-to-end route between any pair of source and destination nodes
that are separated by a large enough number of hops.
Assuming that the end-to-end routes are somehow established through some out-
of-band means for fOFDM, to ensure an acceptable level of performance, reliability
mechanisms like error correction, ACKs, and retransmissions, etc. should be im-
plemented on a hop-by-hop basis for fOFDM, even for the exchange of real-time
unicast traffic; however, due to very high packet error rates with fOFDM, using ACKs
and frequent retransmissions will also significantly increase the end-to-end packet
delivery delays. However, FBMC on the other hand can afford to use such reliability
mechanisms on an end-to-end basis while still achieving a good performance.
4.7.3.2 Comparison of End-to-End Packet Delivery Delay
Assume that for reliable packet transmissions, ACKs are used. A packet trans-
mission across a hop is successful if only and if it reaches the receiver node without
any errors, and the original sender node correspondingly receives an ACK for the
packet, i.e., there is a cycle of packet transmissions (actual packet + ACK packet)
across each hop. Let pe denote the average packet error rate. Then, the expectation
of the number of cycles to complete a successful packet transmission across one hop
is given by, nc =
1
(1−pe)2 .
Let dca and dtx denote the average channel access and packet transmission delays,
respectively. Since there are two packet transmissions in each cycle, the average delay
per hop is given by, dh = (dca + dtx)× 2× nc.
Let dist denote the distance between source and destination nodes. Let disthop
denote the average distance between two successive hops. Then, the average end-to-
end delay is expressed as dee = d distdisthop e × dh.
Figure 4.18 shows the average end-to-end delay as a function of distance between
the source and destination nodes. For the purpose of plotting this figure, we assume
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a simulation region whose area is 1002m2 and that these nodes blast at full transmit
power. In this figure, the small and large hops correspond to disthop = 35m and
disthop = 66m, respectively. For both PHY layers, larger hop distance produces
smaller end-to-end delays and vice-versa. More importantly, the FBMC PHY layer
yields more than an order of magnitude lower delays in comparison to fOFDM. For
example, at 500m, FBMC achieves about 20× smaller average end-to-end delays than
fOFDM - 19 ms vs 389 ms. Thus, the performance gap between fOFDM and FBMC
grows further with distance in a multihop network.
4.7.4 Discussion
We summarize and discuss some of the main results of our FBMC-based approach
for dynamic spectrum access in vehicular networks as follows.
1. For any given distance, FBMC consistently achieves about 19 dB greater SINR
than that of fOFDM. Therefore, FBMC can help in building very high speed
vehicular networks covering large distances.
2. Packet error rate performance of FBMC is significantly better than fOFDM for
short range communication in outdoor settings given that FBMC can achieve
2.8× to 56× smaller packet error rates in comparison to fOFDM.
3. Due to its ability to successfully transmit 11.7× to 15.5× more bits per sec-
ond than fOFDM, FBMC can enable the deployment of new applications over
vehicular networks that require high data rate (e.g., real-time high definition
video streaming).
4. Due to very high packet drop probabilities (e.g., > 75% with just 5 hops)
with fOFDM, it will require reliability mechanisms like error correction, ACKs,
retransmissions, etc. to be implemented on a hop-by-hop basis to achieve any
reasonably acceptable performance. FBMC, on the other hand, has very low
packet drop probabilities (e.g., < 20% with 5 hops) and hence, it can afford
to use such reliability mechanisms on an end-to-end basis to achieve good
performance.
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5. Finally, in the case of multihop networks, any interactive voice-based com-
munications (e.g., voice-over-IP) will be very difficult with fOFDM, since its
end-to-end packet delivery delays are prohibitively high, close to 400 ms, when
the communicating parties are separated by 500 m. For the same case, FBMC
achieves less than 20 ms delays, which is low enough to easily support real-time
voice communications.
These results can serve as guidelines for designing ad hoc, dynamic spectrum
access communication standards for vehicular networks.
4.8 Related Work
Some existing work [9, 82] has investigated the effectiveness of SR Nyquist filters
from a PHY layer perspective - they have established that SR Nyquist filters exhibit
better magnitude responses in comparison to other types of filters, that FBMC has
a higher bandwidth efficiency because there is no cyclic prefix, and that FBMC is
also very efficient at sensing the channel for free spaces in a cognitive radio setting.
Our work is primarily focused on showing the benefits of SR Nyquist pulse from
a cross layer perspective - in terms of reliable and efficient packet transmissions.
Our analysis on the mutual interference power due to the transmissions of different
nodes provides a PHY layer basis for understanding impact of FBMC at the MAC
layer. In essence, we provide a very thorough comparison using a very comprehensive
set of measures/characteristics that include interference power, SINR, modulation
schemes, packet error rates, transmission and channel access delays, and effective
data transmission rate available to each node at the MAC layer to show that FBMC
is the best choice for dynamic spectrum access networks.
Distributed OFDMA [63] has been proposed for dynamic spectrum access for
applications with predictable traffic demands (e.g., high definition media streaming);
therefore, it obviates the use of contention-based CSMA and hence avoids incurring
any unpredictable medium access delays. Our work, on the other hand, is focused
on exchanging more conventional / best-effort traffic, where nodes contend for the
subcarriers and backoff if necessary; hence, our approach complements [16]. Moreover,
in contrast to [63], we consider nodes with full duplex communication capabilities
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operating on frequency selective fading channels, and which can perform rate adapta-
tion by selecting different modulation schemes. We also show that FBMC can reliably
support high data rate modulation schemes like 256-QAM for a very large portion of
time.
In fine-grained channel access (FICA) [65], the OFDM PHY layer is used for
sharing the subchannels with different nodes. Our work differs from FICA in the
following significant ways. First, FICA uses half-duplex radios; hence, it controls
the number of subchannels that a node can use based on the observed collision
level using an AIMD scheme; but in our system model, the use of multiple radios
minimizes collisions and therefore, we increase/decrease the number of subcarriers
that a node can use through a combination of channel access delay and packet
error rate measures, which together better reflect the overall traffic/contention in
the network as well as the error performance of the channel. Second, unlike FICA’s
channel allocation strategy, our MAC protocol is completely decentralized and we
do not require any RTS/CTS mechanisms for channel reservations or any dedicated
access point for arbitrations. Third, unlike FICA, FBMC does not require all nodes
to time-synchronize their packet transmissions; as a consequence, nodes using FBMC
PHY (i) can transmit variable sized packets, which also avoids additional packet
fragmentation and reassembly overheads; (ii) can use conventional random backoff
mechanisms; and (iii) can share the spectrum with other colocated nodes that use
any different PHY layer. FBMC can achieve these without negatively impacting the
performance since it reduces mutual interference to insignificant levels.
FARA [62] implements downlink OFDMA that has only one transmitter, the
access point, and hence, synchronization problems do not exist. FARA uses a very
wide 100 MHz channel, where the gains could vary significantly between different
subcarriers. Hence, a FARA transmitter may select a different modulation scheme
for each subcarrier. Since each node in our system uses only a small number of
subcarriers from a 20 MHz channel, a transmitter adopts a simpler approach of using
the same modulation scheme on all subcarriers.
Back2F [83] considers a very interesting approach to MAC backoffs in the fre-
quency domain, as an alternative to conventional time domain-based backoff mech-
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anisms, for OFDM-based WiFi networks. We note that dynamic spectrum access
networks can also benefit from a Back2F-like approach when nodes contending for an
overlapping set of subcarriers perform frequency domain backoff on those subcarriers.
However, any approach based on OFDM, including Back2F, requires synchronization
between the transmissions of different nodes, which can be avoided with the use of
FBMC.
Channel width [84] and WhiteFi [72] adapt the width of an OFDM channel
(e.g., 5, 10, or 20 MHz) that a node uses to increase throughput / range. With
a fixed number of subcarriers (equal to 64), wider channels yield higher throughput
due to smaller symbol durations. On the other hand, narrower channels achieve
higher SNR, and hence larger range, due to the fact that the SNR increases when
the transmit power per Hz becomes proportionally higher and that the noise power
becomes proportionally lower while reducing channel width. Narrow channels are also
more resilient to delays spreads because of larger symbol durations; while it results
in reducing packet loss/error rates, it correspondingly lowers the data rate. In our
work, we show that the use of FBMC in vehicular network setup can simultaneously
achieve far larger range and with at least an order of magnitude improvement over
OFDM.
4.9 Conclusion
We examined the use of FBMC for best-effort dynamic spectrum access networks.
We analyzed the mutual interference power across subcarriers used by different trans-
mitters. We devised a distributed and adaptive MAC protocol that coordinates data
packet traffic among the different nodes in the network. We showed that FBMC
consistently outperforms OFDM with an order of magnitude performance improve-
ment in terms of packet transmission delays, channel access delays, and effective data
transmission rate available at the MAC layer in static, indoor environments. We
examined the use of FBMC for dynamic spectrum access in a vehicular network setup
as well. Through extensive simulations, we showed that FBMC outperforms OFDM
with an order of magnitude improvement over large distances in vehicular networks.
Finally, we also showed that in the case of multihop vehicular networks, FBMC can
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achieve about 20× smaller end-to-end packet delivery delays and relatively low packet
drop probabilities in comparison to OFDM. These results can serve as guidelines
for designing ad hoc, dynamic spectrum access communication standards for future
vehicular networks. We have presented these results in three papers [85, 86, 87].






























Figure 4.1. Square-root Nyquist (FBMC), and rectangular (OFDM) pulse shapes.
T is the symbol duration.


























Figure 4.2. PSD of OFDM/fOFDM signal transmitted on subcarrier number 0.
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Figure 4.3. PSD of FBMC signal transmitted on subcarrier number 0.




































Figure 4.4. Interference power on subcarrier number 0 as a function of the subcarrier
number on which the interferer is transmitting.
















Figure 4.5. Variation of SINR for 100 consecutive packets.
129




















Figure 4.6. FBMC enables modulation schemes with very high data rates.



















Figure 4.7. OFDM/fOFDM PHY layer produces very high packet error rates,
whereas FBMC PHY layer produces practically zero packet error rates.
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Figure 4.8. Average transmission delay per packet vs number of nodes.








































Figure 4.9. Average channel access delay per packet vs number of nodes.
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Figure 4.10. Effective data rate vs number of nodes.

































Figure 4.11. Effective data transmission rate as a function of the AIMD MAC
parameter, α for the FBMC PHY layer. Here β = 1/α.
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Figure 4.12. Median SINR vs distance between the transmitter and the receiver.



















Figure 4.13. FBMC enables modulation schemes with very high data rates.
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Figure 4.14. Average transmission delay vs distance between the transmitter and
the receiver.




















Figure 4.15. Average packet error rate vs distance between the transmitter and the
receiver.
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Figure 4.16. Average effective data rate vs distance between the transmitter and
the receiver.






















Figure 4.17. Packet drop probability vs number of hops.
Table 4.1. Blasting at full transmit power vs using power control for fOFDM
Performance Metric fOFDM fOFDM
(full power) (power control)
Transmission delay (µs) 3210.72 3398.01
Channel access delay (µs) 5964.44 6350.48
Packet error rate (%) 25.06 24.77
Effective data rate (bits per second) 106882 100995
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Table 4.2. Blasting at full transmit power vs using power control for FBMC
Performance Metric FBMC FBMC
(full power) (power control)
Transmission delay (µs) 411.804 616.203
Channel access delay (µs) 471.023 775.622
Packet error rate (%) 3.443 12.52
Effective data rate (bits per second) 1435185 825269
Table 4.3. Impact of the size of the simulation area for fOFDM
Performance Metric fOFDM fOFDM
(100m× 100m) (200m× 200m)
Transmission delay (µs) 3210.72 3422.25
Channel access delay (µs) 5964.44 6563.24
Packet error rate (%) 25.06 27.52
Effective data rate (bits per second) 106882 94739
Table 4.4. Impact of the size of the simulation area for FBMC
Performance Metric FBMC FBMC
(100m× 100m) (200m× 200m)
Transmission delay (µs) 411.804 580.142
Channel access delay (µs) 471.023 733.950
Packet error rate (%) 3.443 6.794
Effective data rate (bits per second) 1435185 929976







































Figure 4.18. Average end-to-end packet delivery delay vs distance between the
source and destination nodes. Small and large hop distances are approximately 35m
and 66m, respectively.
CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Summary
We have explored the use of new cross layer opportunities to achieve secrecy and
efficiency of data transmission in wireless networks. We have shown how our systems
oriented, cross layer research enables pervasive wireless devices to efficiently establish
private communication channels that are secure from adversaries with unlimited
computational power. Additionally, we have also shown how our work enables these
devices to efficiently utilize the available wireless spectrum. Our research work has
demonstrated how theoretical concepts can be transformed into real-life systems,
which in turn can serve as a strong foundation for building innovative, mobile systems
and applications.
First, we evaluated the effectiveness of secret key extraction from the received
signal strength (RSS) variations in wireless channels using extensive real-world mea-
surements in a variety of environments and settings. Our experimental results showed
that bits extracted in static environments are unsuitable for generating a secret key.
We also found that an adversary can cause predictable key generation in static
environments. However, bits extracted in dynamic environments showed a much
higher secret bit rate. We developed an environment adaptive secret key generation
scheme and our measurements showed that our scheme performed the best in terms
of generating high entropy bits at a high bit rate in comparison to the existing ones
that we evaluated. The secret key bit streams generated by our scheme also passed
the randomness tests of the NIST test suite that we conducted. We were able to
further enhance the rate of secret bit generation of our scheme by extracting multiple
bits from each RSS measurement. We have presented these results in two major
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papers [14, 43].
Second, we proposed and experimentally evaluated a collaborative secret key
extraction scheme for wireless sensor networks. Our experimental results showed
that there is a significant increase in secret bit rate per second and per probe as
well as per mJ of transmission energy, due to collaboration. We also evaluated the
fundamental performance trade-off due to the increased number of measurements
versus the increased bit mismatch rate. While it may appear that collaboration
requires many nodes, leveraging measurements from many different sensors enables
extraction of stronger secret keys at a faster rate and in an energy efficient manner.
While the hierarchical approach uses more bandwidth (i.e., more than one channel),
it correspondingly reduces the duration over which the channels are occupied. We
have presented these results in three papers [55, 43, 56].
Finally, we examined the use of FBMC for best-effort dynamic spectrum access
networks. We analyzed the mutual interference power across subcarriers used by
different transmitters. We devised a distributed and adaptive MAC protocol that
coordinates data packet traffic among the different nodes in the network. We showed
that FBMC consistently outperforms OFDM with an order of magnitude performance
improvement in terms of packet transmission delays, channel access delays, and effec-
tive data transmission rate available at the MAC layer in static, indoor environments.
We examined the use of FBMC for dynamic spectrum access in a vehicular network
setup as well. Through extensive simulations, we showed that FBMC outperforms
OFDM with an order of magnitude improvement over large distances in vehicular
networks. Finally, we also showed that in the case of multihop vehicular networks,
FBMC can achieve about 20× smaller end-to-end packet delivery delays and rel-
atively low packet drop probabilities in comparison to OFDM. These results can
serve as guidelines for designing ad hoc, dynamic spectrum access communication
standards for future vehicular networks. We have presented these results in three
papers [85, 86, 87].
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5.2 Future Research Directions
5.2.1 Pervasive Adoption of Secret Key Extraction
Achieving unconditional information security still remains a holy grail. A secret
key establishment system using the randomness in the wireless channel is only a step
towards achieving unconditional security. While our secret key establishment method
is capable of producing arbitrarily long secret keys, which when used as one-time
pad, can provide security against adversaries with unlimited computational power,
more efficient methods of estimating the wireless channel are necessary for wide-
spread adoption of this approach. Next, while secret key establishment is only one
aspect of secure communication between any two wireless devices, the other primary
aspect is authentication, which also remains a major challenge. We can anticipate
a pervasive deployment of secret key extraction when it works in conjunction with
novel authentication mechanisms such as remote device fingerprinting [27, 26], or
human-verifiable authentication using camera phones [88].
5.2.2 Secret Key Extraction Using Feature-rich
Measurements
Secret key establishment using wireless channel characteristics can benefit from
using a feature-rich set of channel measurements obtained from, for example, ultra-
wide-band transceivers. Additionally, recent developments have made it possible to
measure the channel frequency response over a wide-band and MIMO channel using
off-the-shelf Intel WiFi Link 5300 802.11n wireless cards [89]. Each measurement
in such datasets captures the attenuation of the wireless channel as a function of
time or frequency, and can offer significantly higher entropy for potentially faster key
establishment. It will be interesting to explore these new avenues for key extraction
in different environments.
5.2.3 Secret Key Extraction under Hidden Terminal
Interference
When there are hidden terminals in an 802.11 network, the packet loss rate can
increase significantly due to repeated packet collisions/interference at a common
receiver. An increase in packet loss rate subsequently reduces the channel sampling
rate and hence negatively impacts secret key extraction. ZigZag decoding [90] exploits
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different interference-free stretches across successive collisions for a given pair of
packets to successfully recover them. Gollakota et al. [90] show that the packet loss
rates under hidden terminal scenarios can be reduced by two orders of magnitude
(from 73% to 0.7%). Thus, when Alice and Bob implement ZigZag decoding, they
can obtain estimates of the wireless channel more often over the interference-free
stretches than a typical 802.11 receiver and hence can substantially improve the secret
key extraction performance even in the presence of hidden terminal interference.
5.2.4 High SNR Measurements for Secret Key Extraction
The number of secret bits that can be obtained from a sample depends on the
mutual information between the channel measurements of Alice and Bob. Mutual
information, in turn, increases with SINR. Ye et al. show that the mutual information
increases roughly at the rate of one secret bit per sample for every 3 dB increase in
SNR [30, 42]. In this dissertation, we have shown that square-root Nyquist pulse
has very good interference rejection characteristics and can achieve very high SINR
in comparison to the rectangular pulse, which is widely used in standards such as
802.11. It will be interesting to explore secret key extraction under square-root
Nyquist pulse and determine the increase in secret key generation rate using an actual
FBMC implementation.
5.2.5 Real-world Adoption of FBMC
In this dissertation, we have evaluated the cross layer performance of FBMC
using simulation models for the case of single input single output systems. However,
widespread adoption requires successful demonstration of a real-world FBMC imple-
mentation over an actual dynamic spectrum access network built using our AIMD
MAC protocol. Furthermore, it also depends on the development of new FBMC
methods that enable MIMO capabilities for the enhancement of data rate and/or
robustness to errors. While deployment of MIMO technique is better understood in
the case of OFDM (e.g., IEEE 802.11n standard), there are only a limited number
of existing studies on the development of MIMO-FBMC systems [67]. However, as
Farhang et al. [67] have pointed out, FBMC systems can offer the same flexibility
as OFDM in adopting the various MIMO techniques. A solid evaluation of MIMO-
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FBMC systems is required to investigate its cross layer performance.
5.2.6 Coexistence of FBMC with Legacy-OFDM Systems
While FBMC is promising for dynamic spectrum access networks, it is foreseeable
that a full-adoption of FBMC will occur over a certain period of time in the future
and until then, users of FBMC and OFDM systems are likely to coexist. Given this
scenario, it is important to evaluate the coexistence of OFDM and FBMC users on the
same channel during this transition period. Some of the important issues of relevance
include – (i) evaluating the performance as a function of the separation between the
subcarriers of FBMC and OFDM users, (ii) evaluating the performance as a function
of the ratio of the numbers of OFDM/FBMC users, (iii) finding new ways to adapt
the behavior of the MAC protocol due to the disparity in the performance of OFDM
and FBMC users.
5.2.7 Enhancing the Range, Throughput of an FBMC Network
Channel width [84] and WhiteFi [72] adapt the width of a channel (e.g., 5, 10, or
20 MHz) that a node uses to increase throughput or range for the case of an OFDM
system. With a fixed number of subcarriers (equal to 64), wider channels yield higher
throughput due to smaller symbol durations. On the other hand, narrower channels
achieve higher SNR, and hence larger range, due to the fact that the SNR increases
when the transmit power per Hz becomes proportionally higher and that the noise
power becomes proportionally lower while reducing channel width. Narrow channels
are also more resilient to delays spreads because of larger symbol durations; while it
results in reducing packet loss/error rates, it correspondingly lowers the data rate. It
will be interesting to evaluate the impact of adapting the channel width on the range
and throughput on a network when different nodes use the FBMC PHY layer in the
context of a dynamic spectrum access network. An important avenue for further
exploration will be to find the right balance between the desirable throughput and
range on the basis of the available channel width and the surrounding environment.
In addition to assigning different subsets of subcarriers to different nodes in a dynamic
spectrum access scenario, varying the channel width offers another dimension for the
development of new adaptive MAC protocols.
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